

will not like it: I rather chuse to have a regard for those, who will be very well pleased with it. 'Mr Menage promises to publish an etymological treatise upon the French proverbs. There are few subjects that are so curious as that is, and that require a greater skill in the knowledge of history. There has been a vast number of proverbs in all languages. Dydimus made a collection of them in ten books, which he dedicated to those, who had writ upon that subject. Aldus Manutius published something of Didymus's work with Tharræus's proverbs, in the year 1505. But it is to be observed, that Greek and Latin proverbs are not so numerous, as Erasmus, and those who have collected what was omitted by him, would make us believe; for it is certain, and they have been sufficiently censured for it, that they took for a proverbial expression what was not so. Oudin made a pretty large collection of French proverbs, intituled, *Curiositez Françoises*, but he does not give their etymologies. The dialogues between a clown and a Philosopher have been often reprinted at Paris; they contain the origin of a considerable number of proverbs, sometimes right, and sometimes wrong. The edition of 1665 is intituled, *Les illustres Proverbes nouveaux & Historiques expliqués par diverses Questions curieuses & morales* 2 vol. in 12mo. Mr Furetiere, who has published a second case very satirical against several members of the French academy, pretends that the proverbs of his Universal Dictionary are not taken from that of the academy, and that in order to remove their meanness, he has enriched most of them by enquiring into their origin, or applying to them curious histories, and comparing them with the proverbs of other nations, which Paquier, Belinghen, and other grave authors, have not thought unworthy of their pen (5). A good supplement might be made to this long passage. It might be said that Belinghen, mentioned by Furetiere, should have been called Fleury de Belinghen, which was his true name. I think he taught French in Holland. He published at the Hague in 1656, *L'Etymologie ou Explication des Proverbes François*, divided into three books by way of a dialogue. It is a book in 8vo of 363 pages. The *Premiers essais des Proverbes*, published by that author in 1653, having met with a good reception, he resolved to put out a second edition much larger, viz. that whose title I have just now mentioned. Mr de Brieux published at Caën the origins of some proverbs in the year 1672, in 12mo. If

we go higher, we shall find at the end of Nicod's Dictionary (6) the *Explications morales d'aucuns Proverbes communs en la Langue Françoisé*, with a translation of some French proverbs into Latin verse, by *Joannes Ægidius Nuceriensis*. You will find in Morhofius's *Polybistor* many things upon this subject; you will find there that Angelus Monofinius has treated at large of the Italian proverbs in a book printed at Venice in the year 1604, and (7) that Julius Varini wrote a book, intituled, *Scuola del Volgo* (8), wherein the Italian proverbs are placed according to the order of human actions, and attended with some prudential precepts. You will see there that the alphabetical collection of Italian proverbs, made by Orland Perisquet, is to be found in Gruterus's Thesaurus, and that one Thomaso Buoni, who is mentioned, published a collection of Italian proverbs, in two volumes (9). But you will not find there the *origine de vulgari Proverbi*, published by Aloysio Cinthio, at Venice, in the year 1526 (10). Morhofius had forgot the name of a modern author, who has collected the Italian proverbs, and is mentioned in the Journals (11): This new author is no other than Mr Menage. It does not appear that Morhofius was well acquainted with the writers of our French proverbs. He only mentions the collection of an anonymous author, and that of *Job. Ægidius Nuceriensis*, and the first edition of Belinghen's proverbs, and lastly, of one le Duc, who put out a book (12), intituled, *Proverbes en Rimes, ou Rimes en Proverbes*. Morhofius knew the collection of Spanish proverbs made by Ferdinand Nunez, Professor of Eloquence and of the Greek tongue at Salamanca, and the *Filosofia vulgar* of Juan de Nial Lara (13), and the *Medicina Espannola contenida en Proverbios vulgares de nuestra Lengua*, composed by Juan Soropan de Rieros. That *Filosofia vulgar* is a collection of a thousand proverbs, with their explanation. I do not wonder he does not mention the book of our Spinosa; for it is lost. He does not forget the compilers of German, English, and Dutch proverbs. I know no author that mentions Polydore Virgil, who pretends to have broke the ice, both with respect to proverbs, and to the inventors of things. His treatise of proverbs came out in 1498, and was dedicated to Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino (14). I have an edition of it revised and enlarged the fourth time. It was printed at Basil 1541, it contains 456 pages in 8vo.

- (6) The edition I make use of is that of Paris 1606, in folio.
(7) Morhofius, Polyhist. lib. i, cap. xxi, pag. 256.
(8) Printed at Verona 1642, in 12mo.
(9) Printed at Venice in 8vo, in the year 1604 and 1606.
(10) See Nicolaus Antonio, Bibl. Hisp. Tom. i, pag. 559.
(11) Mentio etiam fit, si rectè memini, in postremis Ephemeridibus Gallicis novi cujusdam autoris qui Proverbia Italica congesterit, cujus mihi nunc nomen excidit. Morhofius, Polybistor. lib. i, cap. xxi, pag. 256. The Journal des Savans, 1683, pag. 164, Dutch edit. and the Nouvelles de la Rep. des Lettres, for the same year pag. 64, mention that collection of Mr Menage.
(12) Printed at Paris, 1665, in 12mo.
(13) It should be Mallara.
(14) See the Epistle Dedicatory of the book de Inventoribus Rerum, written by Polydore Virgili

S P I N O Z A (BENEDICT DE) a Jew by birth, who forsook Judaism, and at last became an Atheist, was a native of Amsterdam. He was a systematical Atheist, and brought his Atheism into a new method, tho' the ground of his doctrine was the same with that of several antient and modern Philosophers, both in Europe and the Eastern countries, [A]. As for the latter, one needs only read what I have said

[A] He was a systematical Atheist, and brought his Atheism into a new method, tho' the ground of his new doctrine was the same with that of several antient and modern Philosophers, both in Europe and the eastern countries.] I think he is the first who reduced Atheism into a system, and formed it into a body of doctrine, ordered and connected according to the manner of the Geometricians; but otherwise his opinion is not new. It has been believed long ago, that the whole universe is but one substance, and that God and the world are but one Being. Pietro della Valle mentions certain Mahometans, who call themselves *Ehl Eltablik*, or men of truth, men of certainty, who believe that there is nothing existent but the four elements, which are GOD, man, and every thing else (1). He also mentions the Zindikites, another Mahometan sect. They come near the Sadducees, and have their name from them. They do not believe a providence, nor the resurrection of the dead, as Giggoius shews upon the word Zindik (2). . . . One of their opinions is, that whatever is seen, whatever is in the world, whatever hath been created is GOD (3). There have been such Heretics among Christians; for we find in the beginning of the XIIIth century, one David of Dinant, who made no distinction between God and the first matter. It is a mistake to say that he is the first who vented such a foolish doctrine (4). Does not Albertus Magnus mention a Philosopher, who had done the like?

'Alexander Epicureus dixit Deum esse materiam, vel non esse extra ipsam, & omnia essentialiter esse Deum, & formas esse accidentia imaginata; & non habere veram entitatem, & ideo dixit omnia idem esse substantialiter, & hunc Deum appellavit aliquando Jovem, aliquando Apollinem, & aliquando Palladem; & formas esse pepulum Palladis, & vestem Jovis; & neminem sapientum aiebat ad plenum revelare posse ea quæ latebant sub peplo Palladis & sub veste Jovis (5). . . . Alexander the Epicurean held, that GOD was matter, or was not different from it, and that all things were essentially GOD, and that forms were imaginary accidents, and had no real entity, and therefore he said all things were substantially the same; and this GOD he called sometimes Jupiter, sometimes Apollo, and sometimes Pallas: and that forms were the robe of Pallas, and garment of Jupiter; and he asserted that none of the wise men could fully reveal what was concealed under the robe of Pallas, and the garment of Jupiter.' Some believe that this Alexander lived in Plutarch's time (6); others say in express words, that he lived before David of Dinant. Secutus fuit Alexandrum qui fecit librum de materia, ubi probare conatur omnia esse unum in materia. This we find in the margin of the treatise, in which Thomas Aquinas confutes that monstrous and extravagant opinion (7). Perhaps, David of Dinant knew not that there was such a Philosopher of the Epicurean sect,

- A LIST of some persons who had the same opinion with Spinosa.
(1) See the article ABUMUS. LAMUS, remark [A].
(2) Belpier, Remarques curieuses sur Ricaut, Etat présent de l'Empire Ottoman, pag. 648.
(3) Pietro della Valle, pag. 394, of the 2nd Tom. apud Belpier, ib.
(4) Afferuit Deum esse materiam primam, quod nemo ante eum deliraverat. Theoph. Raynaud. Theol. Naturali, distinct. vi, num. 6, pag. 563.

- (5) Albertus in I Phys. Tract. iii, cap. xiii, apud Pererium de communibus Principiis, lib. v, cap. xii, pag. m. 309, 310.
(6) Is est, opinor, quem inter sodales suos in memorat Plutarchus II, sympo. 3. Theomastus, Dissertat. XIV, ad Phil. Stoic. pag. 199.
(7) Ad lib. i, Tomæ contra Gentil. cap. xvii, f. 23 ed. Lugd. A. 1586. Thomæ ibid. p. 200.

said in the remark [D] of the article JAPAN, and what I shall say below concerning the Theology

(8) See Prateolus, in Elencho Hærefum, Voce Amalricus, pag. m. 23. He says, that according to some authors, that Heretic and his adherents were burnt alive.

(9) Hæc de Amalrico Gerson tract. de Concord. Metaph. cum Leg. Part. IV, Oper. alphab. 20, lit. N. ex Hostiensis & Odone Tusculano. Thomastus, Disser. XIV, ad Phil. Stoic. 200.

(10) Cicero de Nat. Deorum, lib. i, cap. li.

(11) Idem, Academ. Quæst. lib. ii, cap. xxxviii.

fect; but at least it must be granted me, that he knew very well he had not invented that doctrine. Had he not learned it of his master? Was he not the disciple of that Amalricus, whose dead body was dug up and burnt in the year 1208, and who taught that all things were God, and but one Being (8)? 'Omnia sunt Deus: Deus est omnia. Creator & creatura idem. Ideæ creant & creantur. Deus ideo dicitur finis omnium, quod omnia reversura sunt in ipsum; ut in Deo immutabiliter conquirecant, & unum individuum atque incommutabile permanebunt. Et sicut alterius naturæ non est Abraham, alterius Isaac, sed unius atque ejusdem: sic dixit omnia esse unum, & omnia esse Deum. Dixit enim, Deum esse essentiam omnium creaturarum (9). - - - All things are GOD, GOD is all things. Creator and creature the same. Ideas create and are created. GOD is therefore said to be the end of all things, because they all return into him, that they may rest unchangeably in GOD, and continue one individual and unalterable. And as Abraham is not of one nature, Isaac of another, but of one and the same: so he asserted that all things were one, and all things were GOD. For he affirmed GOD to be the essence of all creatures.' I dare not affirm that Strato, a Peripatetic Philosopher, was of the same opinion; for I do not know whether he taught that the universe or nature was a simple and only substance: I only know, that he believed it to be inanimate, and that he acknowledged no other God than nature. 'Nec audiendus ejus (Theophrasti) auditor Strato, is qui Physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quæ causas gignendi, augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu ac figura (10). - - - Neither is Strato, Theophrastus's disciple, to be heard, he who is called the Natural Philosopher, who thinks that all divine power was lodged in nature, in which are the causes of producing, increasing, and diminishing, but is without any sense or figure.' As he laughed at Epicurus's atoms and vacuum, one might think that he made no distinction between the several parts of the world; but this is no necessary consequence. All that can be concluded is, that his opinion comes a great deal nearer Spinozism, than the system of atoms. Here follows a passage, wherein it is more largely set forth. 'Negas sine Deo posse quicquam, ecce tibi è transverso Lampfacenus Strato, qui det isti Deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris. Sed quum Sacerdotes Deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est æquius habere ipsos Deos? Negat opera Deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quæcunque sint docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille qui asperis, & levibus, & hamatis, uncinatisque corpusculis concreta hæc esse dicat interjecto inani, somnia senset hæc esse Democriti non docentis, sed optantis. Ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens, quicquid aut sit, aut fiat, naturalibus fieri, aut factum esse docet ponderibus & motibus: sic ille & Deum opere magno liberat, & me timore (11). - - You deny any thing to have power but GOD; behold, on the contrary, how Strato of Lampascus, gives to that GOD an immunity from acting. And seeing the priests of the gods enjoy a vacation, how much more reasonable is it that the gods themselves should have it? He denies that he uses the operation of the gods in fabricating the world. All things that exist, he says, are effected by nature, not as he who said, that all things were formed by the coalition of rough, smooth, crooked, and hooked particles, vacuities being interspersed, he thinks these to be the dreams of Democritus. But, considering all the parts of the world, he asserts that all things which exist, or are made, are produced by weights and motions: so he hath exempted GOD from great labour, and me from fear.' There is even ground to believe that he did not teach, as the Atomists did, that the world was a new work, and produced by chance; but that he taught, as the Spinozists do, that nature has produced it necessarily and from all eternity. I think the following words of Plutarch, if rightly understood, signify, that nature made all things of itself, and without knowledge, and not that it's works began by chance. Τελευταῖν τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ὡς ζῶν εἶναι τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην. ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδεδῆναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἴτα ὡς περιγενέ-

ῶναι τὸν φυσικὸν ἀντὶ τῶν ἐκείνων. Denique mundum ipsum animal esse negat (Strato) vultque naturam sequi temerarios fortunæ impetus, initium enim rebus dare spontaneam quandam naturæ vim, & sic deinceps ab eadem natura physicis motibus imponi finem (12). - - Finally, Strato denies that the world itself is an animal, and will have it, that nature obeys the casual impulses of fortune, for a certain spontaneous power of nature gives to things a beginning, and in like manner afterwards, an end is put by the same nature to Physical motions. This translation, which I have found in page 58 of Lescaloperius's commentary upon Cicero de Natura Deorum, and to which I have added enim after initium, is better than that of Amyot, and that of Xylander: nevertheless, there is something in it that does not suit the notion one ought to have of the opinion of that famous Philosopher, the greatest of all the Peripatetics (13). The words temerarii fortunæ impetus spoil the symmetry of his system; and we see that Lactantius distinguishes it from that of the Epicureans, and ascribes no chance to it. 'Qui nolunt, says he (14), divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut principiis inter se temerè coeuntibus dicunt esse concretum, aut repente natura extitisse. Natura verò (ut ait Straton) habere in se vim gignendi, & vivendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum, nec figuram: ut intelligamus, omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice, nec auctore. Utrumque vanum, & impossibile. - - Those who will not have the world to have been made by divine providence, say, that it either proceeded from the fortuitous concurrence of principles, or, on a sudden, existed by nature. But nature (as Strato says) has in itself the power of producing, and of living, but hath neither any sense nor figure: that we may understand all things to be produced spontaneously, without any artificer or author. But both these opinions are frivolous and absurd.' Note, that Seneca represents Plato's doctrine and that of Strato, as two opposite extremes: one of them deprived God of a body, and the other deprived him of a soul (15). I think I have read in Father Salier's book upon the species of the Eucharist, that several antient Philosophers or Heretics taught the unity of all things; but because I have not that book now, I only mention this by the by. Father Salier is a French Minime. His book printed at Paris, in the year 1689, is intitled, *Historia Scholastica de speciebus Eucharisticis, sive de formarum materialium natura singularis observatio ex profanis sacrisque Autoribus*. It has been mentioned in the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Sçavans*, for September 1690, page 13.

The doctrine of the soul of the world, which was so common among the Antients, and made the principal part of the system of the Stoics is, at the bottom, the same with that of Spinoza. Which would more clearly appear, if it had been explained by authors versed in Geometry; but because the books wherein it is mentioned, are written rather in a rhetorical than a dogmatical method; whereas Spinoza is a precise writer, and avoids the figurative style, which often hinders us from having a just notion of a body of doctrine; hence it is that we find several material differences between his system, and that of the soul of the world. If any one should maintain that Spinozism is more coherent, he should also maintain that it is not so orthodox; for the Stoics did not deprive God of his providence; they re-united in him the knowledge of all things; whereas Spinoza ascribes to him only separated and very limited knowledge. Read these words of Seneca. 'Eundem quem nos Jovem intelligunt, custodem RECTOREMQUE universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operis dominum & artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis illum fatum vocare? non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis illum providentiam dicere? recte dices. Est enim, cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, & actus suos explicet. Vis illum naturam vocare? non peccabis. Est enim, ex quo nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu vivimus. Vis illum vocare mundum? non falleris. Ipse enim est, totum quod vides, totus suis partibus inditus, & se sustinens vi sua (16). Quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui Dei pars est? Totum hoc quo continemur, & unum est, & Deus,

(12) Plutarchus adversus Colotem, p. 1115, B.

(13) Τὸν ἀληθινὸν Περὶ τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντικεινὸν τῷ κοινῷ Φαίετατος Στράτωνος. Peripateticorum reliquorum summus Strato. Plutarch. ubi supra.

(14) Lactant. de ira Dei, cap. x, pag. 533.

(15) Ego feram aut Platonem aut Peripateticum Stratonem, alter fecit Deum sine corpore, alter sine animo? Seneca, in Libro contra Superstitiones, apud Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. vi, cap. x.

(16) Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. ii, cap. x.

Theology of a sect of the Chinese [B]. I have not been able to learn any particulars relating

(17) Idem, Epist. XCII, pag. m. 381.

Deus, & focii ejus fumus & membra (17). - - - They mean the same Jupiter as we, the preserver and GOVERNOR of the universe, a mind and spirit, the Lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every appellation doth agree. Will you call him Fate? You will not be mistaken. It is he upon whom all things depend, the cause of causes. Will you name him Providence? You will be in the right. For it is he by whose care this world is so ordered that it goes on steadily, and exerts it's operations. Will you give him the name of Nature? You mistake not. For it is he from whom all things receive their beginning, by whose spirit we live. Will you call him the World? You speak the truth. For he is all what you see, all diffused through all it's parts, and supporting himself by his own power. Why therefore do not you believe that there is something divine in that which is a part of God? All that in which we are contained, is both one, and God, and we are his companions and members. Read also Cato's discourse in the ninth book of Lucan's *Pharsalia*, especially these three verses:

Estne Dei sedes nisi terra, & pontus, & aer,
Et coelum & virtus? Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Juppiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque mor-
veris (18).

Is not the seat of Jove, earth, sea, and air,
And heaven, and virtue? Where wou'd we further trace
The god? Where'er we move, what'er we see
Is Jove. - - -

I shall observe, by the way, an absurdity of those, who maintain the system of the soul of the world. They say, that all the souls both of men and brutes, are particles of the soul of the world, which are re-united to their whole, by the death of the body: And to make us understand it, they compare animals to bottles full of water; floating upon the sea. If those bottles were broke, their water would be re-united to its whole; thus it is with particular souls, say they, when death destroys the organs in which they were shut up. Nay, some say that extasies, dreams, and intense meditations, re-unite a man's soul to the soul of the world, and that this is the reason why people foretel things to come by composing figures of Geomancy. *Nihil heic attingo de arte illa prophetica deque Geomantia, quibus ipse Fluddus quam plurimum tribuit. Etsi enim mens cogitando sic in seipsam colligi, ac veluti abstrahi possit, ut humanas res contempletur velut è quadam specula: attamen quod illa possit, quandiu hoc mortali circumvestitur corpore, ita uniri animæ mundanæ, ut sicut illa omnia cognoscit, ita ipsa particeps fiat cognitionis hujusmodi: quod illa item in hac extasi digitos regat ad exprimenda varia punctula, ex quibus effectus sive arbitrarios, sive fortuitos colligere liceat: hoc aut longe fallor, aut fabulam sapit* (19). - - - It is no difficult thing to perceive the falsity of this parallel. The matter of the bottles floating in the sea is an inclosure, which keeps the sea water from touching the water they are full of; but if there was a soul of the world, it would be dispersed through all the parts of the universe, and therefore nothing could prevent the union of the soul to its whole, and death could not produce that re-union. I shall set down a long passage of Bernier, whereby it will appear, that Spinozism is only a particular method of explaining a doctrine, which very much prevails in the East Indies.

You are not ignorant of the doctrine of many ancient philosophers concerning the great soul of the world, whereof they say our souls and those of Brutes are portions. Should we thoroughly examine Plato's and Aristotle's doctrine, perhaps we should find that it was their opinion. This is in a manner the universal doctrine of the Pendets, Pagans in the East Indies; and that very same doctrine constitutes to this day the cabala of the Soufys, and of the greatest part of the men of letters in Persia, and is explained in Persian verses very sublime and emphatical in their Goult-chez-raz, or parterre of mysteries; as it has been the doctrine of Flud, which our great Gassendus has so learnedly confuted, and that wherein most of our Chymists are bewildred. Now those Cabalists, or Indian Pendets, carry the extravagance farther than all those philosophers, and pretend that

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God, or that Supreme Being, which they call Achar; immutable, immoveable, has not only produced or taken souls out of its own substance, but also whatever is material and corporeal in the universe, and that their production was not made in the way of efficient causes, but as a spider produces a cob-web out of its own bowels, and re-assumes it whenever it pleases. Creation therefore, say these imaginary doctors, is only an extraction or extension, which God makes of his own substance, of those webs which he draws, as it were, out of his own bowels, in the same manner as destruction is only his re-assuming that divine substance, those divine webs into himself; so that the last day of the world, which they call Maperlé, or Pralea, in which they believe there will be a general destruction of all things, will only be a general re-assuming of all those webs which God had thus emitted out of himself. And therefore, say they, there is nothing real and effective in any thing which we think we see, hear, smell, taste, or touch: this world is nothing but a kind of dream, and a meer illusion; because that multitude and great variety of things, that appear to us, are but one and the same thing, viz. God himself, as all our different numbers; ten, twenty, one hundred, a thousand, and so of others; are but one and the same unity repeated several times. But if you ask them a reason of such a fancy, and if you desire them to explain that emanation and return of substance, that extension, that apparent diversity, or how it comes to pass that God, who is not corporeal, but Biapék, as they own, and incorruptible, should nevertheless be divided into so many portions of bodies and souls; their answer consists only in comparisons, that God is like an immense ocean, in which many vials full of water should move; that those vials, wherever they should go, would be always in the same ocean, in the same water; and that if they should break, the waters contained in them would then be united to their whole, to that ocean of which they are portions. Or they will tell you, that it is with God as it is with light, which is the same all over the world, and yet appears a thousand ways different, according to the variety of the objects (20) on which it falls, or according to the different colours and figures of the glasses thro' which it is conveyed. They will answer you, I say, only with these comparisons, which have no proportion to God, and are only fit to cast a mist before the eyes of ignorant people; and no solid answer can be expected from them. If they be told that those vials would indeed be in the like water, but not in the same (21), and that there is indeed a like light all over the world, but not the same; and so with many other strong objections, with which they are perpetually confounded; they repeat still the same comparisons, and the same fine words, or, as the Soufys do, the fine poems of their Goult-chez-raz (22).

It appears from the following passage that Peter Abelard is accused of asserting that all things are God, and that God is all things. 'Primam elementorum concordiam esse Deum & materiam ex qua reliqua fierent, docuit Empedocles. . . . Hæc erat illius ætatis Theosophia, hæc notitia quæ de Causa principis habebatur. Jam tandem obsoleverat, & inter veterum somnia & phantasmata recenscebatur. Eam inter veteris Philosophiæ parietinas & rudera revocavit Petrus Abailardus, ingenio audax, & famâ ce-leber: Sepultam cineribus invenit, & quasi Eurydicen Orpheus ab inferis tandem revocavit. Testor Vazquezium i. part. quæst. 3. art. 8. numb. 28. & Smisingum de Deo tract. 1. disp. 2. quæst. 2. numb. 54. Deum esse omnia, & omnia esse Deum, eum in omnia converti, omnia in eum transmutari asseruit, quia Empedocleâ, aut fortè Anaxagoricâ præventus Theosophiâ, distinguebat species secundum solam apparentiam, nempe quia aliquot Atomî in uno subjecto erant educæ quæ latebant in alio (23). . . . Empedocles taught, that the first amicable conjunction of the elements was GOD and matter, of which the other beings were made - - - This was the Theology of that age, this their opinion of the first cause. But at last it grew obsolete, and was reckoned amongst the dreams and chimeras of the antients. This among the ruins and rubbish of the antients was revived by Peter Abelard, a man

(20) There is here an error of the press in the original.

(21) Note, that the Spinozists make no better answer to the distinction between same and like.

(22) Bernier, Suite des Mémoires sur l'Empire du grand Mogol, pag. 202 & seq. Dutch Edit.

(23) Caramuel, Philosophiæ Realis, lib. iii, §. iii, pag. 175.

(19) Gassendus, in Examine Philosophiæ. Fluddæ, num. 29, Operum Tom. iii, pag. 247.

relating to Spinoza's family; but there is ground to believe it was mean and inconsiderable

'a man bold, and famous: he found it buried in ashes, and, as Orpheus did Eurydice, brought it back from hell. My authors are Vasquez and Smifungus. He asserted, that GOD was all things, and all things were GOD, that GOD was converted into all things, and all things transformed into God, because prepossessed with the Theology of Empedocles, or perhaps of Anaxagoras, he distinguished the species according to appearance only, namely, because some atoms appear in one subject which lay hid in another.'

[B] What I say concerning the Theology of a sect of the Chinese.] The name of that sect is Foe Kiao. It was established by royal authority among the Chinese in the year 65 of the Christian Era. Its first founder was a son of the King In fan nam, and was at first called Xe, or Xe Kia (24); and afterwards when he was thirty years of age, Foe, that is, no man (25). The Prolegomena of the Jesuits prefixed to Confucius's book published by them at Paris, treats of that founder at large. It is said there, that (26) having retired

into a desert, as soon as he came to be nineteen years of age, and having put himself under the discipline of four Gymnosophists to learn Philosophy of them, he remained under their direction till the age of thirty years, when rising in the morning before break of day, and contemplating the planet Venus, that bare sight gave him immediately a perfect knowledge of the first principle; so that being full of a divine inspiration, or rather of pride and folly, he betook himself to instruct men, gave out himself as a god, and drew after him fourscore thousand disciples.... At seventy-nine years of age, being upon the point of death he declared to his disciples, that for the space of forty years that he had preached to the world, he had not told them the truth; that he had concealed it under the veil of metaphors and figures; but that it was time now to declare it to them. *There is nothing, said he, to be inquired after, and on which one may place ones hopes, but nothingness and a vacuum* *, which is the first principle of all things. Here is a man very different from our unbelievers: they do not leave off speaking against religion but towards the latter end of their life; they only renounce their Libertinism, when they think the time of departing this life draws near (27). But it was then that Foe began to declare his Atheism. *Teterrimum virus Atheismi jam moriturus evomuisse perhibetur, diserte professus, se per annos quadraginta eoque amplius non declarasse mundo veritatem, sed umbratili & metaphorica doctrina contentum, figuris, similibus, & parabolis nudam veritatem occultasse; at nunc tandem, quando esset morti proximus, arcanum sensum animi sui significare velle: extra vacuum igitur & inane, primum scilicet rerum omnium principium, nihil esse quod generatur, nihil in quo collocetur spes nostræ* (28). His method was the reason why his disciples divided his doctrine into two parts: one is outward, and is that which is publicly preached and taught; the other is inward, which is carefully concealed from the vulgar, and discovered only to those that are initiated. The outward doctrine, which, as the Bonzes express it, 'is only like the wooden frame on which an arch is built, and that is afterwards removed, when the building is finished, consists 1. In teaching that there is a real difference between good and evil, justice and injustice: 2. That there is another life wherein men shall be punished or rewarded for what they have done in this world: 3. That happiness may be attained by thirty two figures and fourscore qualities. 4. That Foe or Xaca is a deity and the saviour of men, that he was born for their sake, out of compassion for the errors he saw them in, that he has expiated their sins, and that by virtue of his expiation they shall obtain salvation after death, and shall have a new and more happy birth in another world (29). They add to this five moral precepts, and six works of mercy, and threaten with damnation those who neglect those duties.

The inward doctrine, which is never imparted to the vulgar, because they ought to be kept to their duty by the fear of hell, and such like stories, as those Philosophers say, is however in their opinion, the solid and true one. It consists in laying down, as the principle and end of all things, a certain vacuum and real nothingness. They say, our first parents issued from that vacuum, and returned into it

when they died, and that it is so with all men, who are resolved into that principle by death; that men, all the elements, and all creatures, make part of that vacuum; and that therefore there is but one and the same substance, which is different in all particular beings only by figures and qualities, or an internal configuration, much like water, which is always essentially water, whether it has the form of snow, hail, rain, or ice (30). If it be a monstrous thing to assert that plants, brutes, and men are really the same thing, and to ground such an opinion upon this that all particular beings are not distinct from their principle (31), it is still more monstrous to say, that this principle has no thought, no power, no virtue. And yet, this is the doctrine of those Philosophers, they place the supreme perfection of that principle in its inaction, and absolute repose. *Hoc autem principium cum doceant esse prorsus admirandum quid, purum, limpidum, infinitum, subtile, quod nec generari possit nec corrumpi, quod perfectio sit rerum omnium ipsumque summe perfectum & quietum; negant tamen, corde, virtute, mente, potentia ulla instructum esse: imo hoc esse maxime proprium essentiae ipsius, ut nihil agitet, nihil intelligat, appetat nihil* (32). Spinoza was not so absurd: the only or sole substance he admits, is always acting, always thinking; and his most general abstractions could not enable him to divest it of action and thought. The foundations of his doctrine do not allow it.

Observe, by the by, that the followers of Foe teach Quietism; for they say that all those, who seek true happiness, ought to be so far absorbed by profound meditations, as to make no use of their intellect, and that they ought, through a perfect insensibility, to sink into the repose and inaction of the first principle; which is the true way of being perfectly like it and partaking of happiness. They further say, that those, who have attained to that state of quietude, may follow the usual course of life as to the outside, and teach others the doctrine commonly received. It is only in private and inwardly, that one ought to practise the contemplative institute of the beatific inaction. *Quocirca quisque bene beateque vivendi sit cupidus, huc assidua meditatione, suique victoria eniti oportere, ut principio suo quam simillimus, affectus omnes humanos domet ac prorsus exstinguat, neque jam turbetur, vel angatur re ulla, sed ecstatici prorsus instar absorptus altissima contemplatione, sine ullo prorsus usu vel ratiocinio intellectus, divina illa quiete, qua nihil sit beatius, perfruatur: quam ubi nactus fuerit, communem vivendi modum & doctrinam tradit aliis, & ipsemet specie tenus sequatur, clam vero sibi vacet ac veritati, & arcana illa quiete vitæque cælestis instituto gaudeat* (33). Those who were most intent upon this contemplation of the first principle, formed a new sect, called *Vu guei Kiao*, that is, the sect of the idle or slothful, *nihil agentium*. Thus among Monks those, who pretend to the most strict observance, form new communities, or a new sect. The greatest lords and the most illustrious persons suffered themselves to be so infatuated with this Quietism, that they believed insensibility to be the way to perfection and beatitude, and that the nearer a man came to the nature of a block or a stone, the greater progress he made, the more he was like the first principle, into which he was to return. It was not enough that the body should be without motion for several hours; the soul was also to be unmoveable, and destitute of all manner of sense. What I have said comes short of the Latin which follows: *Optimates imperii & summos quosque viros hac insania adeo occupatos, ut quo quisque propius ad naturam saxi trunciue accessisset, horas complures sine ullo corporis animique motu persistens, sine ullo vel sensuum usu vel potentiarum, eo profecisse felicius, propiorque & similior evasisse principio suo aërio, in quod aliquando reversurus esset, putaretur* (34). A follower of Confucius refuted the impertinences of that sect, and fully proved this maxim of Aristotle, that nothing can be made out of nothing (35), nevertheless they maintained and spread themselves, and there are many people to this day, who apply themselves to those vain contemplations (36). Did we not know the extravagances of our Quietists (37), we should be apt to think that the writers, who mention those speculative Chinese, neither well understood nor faithfully related what they say of them; but if we consider what

(30) Bibl. Universelle, Tom. vii, p. 406.

(31) Omnia, quæcunque existunt, vita, sensu, mente prædita, quamvis inter se usu & figura differant, intrinsicè tamen unum quid idemque esse, quippe à principio suo distincta. *Acta Erudit. Lips.* 1688, pag. 258.

(32) Ibid.

QUIETISM taught and practised by some Chinese.

(33) *Acta Erudit.* 1688, pag. 258. See also the remark [K] of the article B R A C H M A N S.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Copiose probans Aristotelicum illud ex nihilo nihil fieri. *Ibid.*

(36) Ibid.

(37) See the remark [K] in the article B R A C H M A N S.

(24) The Japanese call him Xaca.

(25) See the *Acta Erudit.* 1688, pag. 257, in the Extract of the book of Confucius, printed at Paris in the year 1687.

(26) *Biblioth. Univers.* Tom. vii, pag. 403, 404, in the Extract of the same book of Confucius.

* P. 29. Vacuum & inane, Cum huius in the Chinese Language.

(27) See, above, remark [E] of the article BION the Borysthenite.

(28) *Acta Erudit.* Lipsienf. 1688, pag. 257.

(29) *Biblioth. Universelle*, Tom. vii, pag. 404, & seq. See also the remark [C], of the article J A P A N, and the *Nouveaux Mémoires sur l'état présent de la Chine par le Pere le Comte*, Tom. ii, pag. 103, *Amst.* 1698.

able [C]. He learned the Latin tongue of a Physician (a) who taught it at Amsterdam, and applied himself early to the study of Divinity (b), and bestowed many years upon it: and afterwards he wholly devoted himself to the study of Philosophy. Having a Geometrical Genius, and being desirous to have a good reason for every thing, he quickly disliked the Doctrine of the Rabbins: so that the Jews easily perceived, he did not approve several articles of their religion; for he was against any constraint in matters of belief, and a great enemy to dissimulation, and therefore he freely declared his doubts and his opinions. It is said that the Jews offered to tolerate him, provided he would comply outwardly with their ceremonies, and even that they promised him a yearly pension; but he could not resolve upon such an hypocrisy. However, it was only by degrees that he left their synagogue; and perhaps he would not have broke with them so soon, had he not been treacherously attacked coming from a play, by a Jew, who gave him a thrust with a knife. The wound was slight but he believed the assassin designed to kill him. From that time he left them altogether, which was the reason of his excommunication. I have enquired into the circumstances of it, but have not been able to find them out (c). He wrote, in the Spanish tongue, an apology for his leaving the synagogue, which has not been printed. However it is known that he inserted several things in it, that have appeared since in his *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus* (d), printed at Amsterdam (e) in the year 1670, a pernicious and execrable book, which contains all the seeds of the Atheism he plainly discovered in his *Opera Posthuma*. Mr Stoupp has no reason to insult the ministers of Holland for not answering the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus* [D]. What he says of him is not always true [E]. When

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what passes among Christians, we cannot with reason disbelieve the extravagancies ascribed to the sect *Foe Kiao*, or *Vu guei Kiao*.

I am apt to believe either that the sense, which those men put upon *Cum hiu*, is not exactly expressed, or that their notions are contradictory. They tell us that those words signify *emptiness and nothingness, vacuum & inane*; and in order to confute that sect, this axiom, Nothing can be made out of nothing, has been alledged against them; therefore those who alledged it, must have believed that, according to that sect, nothing is the principle of all Beings. I cannot believe that those Chinese take the word *nothing* in its proper signification, and I fancy they understand it, as people do, when they say that there is nothing in an empty trunk. We have seen that they ascribe some attributes to the first principle, which suppose that they conceive it as a liquid (38). And therefore it is likely they only divest it of the gross and sensible parts of matter. If it be so, the disciple of Confucius would be guilty of the sophism called *ignoratio elenchi*; for he would have understood by the word *nihil*, what has no existence; whereas his adversaries understood by it what has not the properties of sensible matter. I fancy they meant by that word, near the same as what the moderns mean by the word *space*; I say, the moderns, who being neither Cartesians nor Aristotelians, maintain that space is distinct from matter, and that its indivisible, unpalpable, penetrable, unmoveable, and infinite, extension is something real. The disciple of Confucius would have easily proved that such a thing cannot be the first principle, if it is besides destitute of activity, as the speculative Chinese will have it. An extension, tho' never so real, can produce no particular Being, unless it be moved; and if it be supposed that there is no mover, the production of the world will be equally impossible, whether there be an infinite extension, or nothing at all. Spinoza would not deny that position; but he does not admit of a first principle without action. The abstracted extension he gives it in general is only, properly speaking, the idea of space; but he adds motion to it, which may produce the varieties of matter.

[C] *His family . . . was poor and very inconsiderable.* It is well known that Spinoza would not have had a sufficient subsistence, if one of his friends had not left him by his will, wherewithal to maintain himself. The pension that the synagogue offered him, shews that he was not rich.

[D] *Mr Stoupp has no reason to insult the ministers of Holland for not answering the Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus.* He is the author of some letters, intitled, *La Religion des Hollandois*. That book was written at Utrecht in the year 1673, whilst the French were masters of it. Mr Stoupp was then lieutenant-colonel of a Swiss regiment. He raised himself afterwards so far as to be made a Brigadier, and would

have been promoted to higher offices, had he not been killed at the battle of Steinkerken (39). He had been formerly a minister, and had officiated in the French Church of the Savoy at London in Cromwell's time. He affected in the letters I speak of to make an odious description of the great number of sects that are in Holland. Here follows what he says of Spinozism. 'I should think that I have not mentioned all the religions of this country, if I should say nothing of a famous and learned man; who, as I have been assured, has many followers wholly devoted to his opinions. His name is Spinoza; he was born a Jew, and has not abjured the Jewish religion, nor embraced the Christian: and indeed he is a very bad Jew, and not a better Christian. He has published within these few years a Latin book intitled, *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*, wherein the chief thing he seems to aim at is, to destroy all religions, particularly the Jewish and the Christian, and to introduce Atheism, Libertinism, and a full liberty for all religions. He maintains that all of them have been invented for the public good, to the end that all citizens may live honestly and obey their magistrates, and practise virtue, not in hopes of any reward after death, but for the excellency of virtue itself, and the advantages that accrue in this very life to those who follow it. He does not openly declare in that book what he thinks of the Deity; he only gives some hints of it, and thereby discovers it, whereas in conversation he plainly declares that God is not an intelligent, and a most perfect and happy Being, as we fancy; but only the power of nature, diffused all over the world. Spinoza lives in this country; he has been some time at the Hague, where he was visited by all the curious, and even by some women of quality, who pretend to more wit than is allotted to their sex. His followers dare not discover themselves, because his book wholly overthrows the foundations of all religions, and has been condemned by a public decree of the States, and the sale of it is forbidden, tho' they sell it still publickly. Among all the Divines that are in this country, none has ventured to confute the opinions contained in that treatise. I am the more surprised at it, because the author discovers a great knowledge of the Hebrew tongue, of all the ceremonies of the Jewish religion, of all the customs of the Jews, and of Philosophy; and therefore those Divines cannot say that it is a book that deserves no answer. If they continue to be silent, it will be said that they have no charity, since they leave such a pernicious book unanswered, or that they approve the opinions of the author, or have not the courage and ability to confute them (40).'

The reader may be pleased to observe, that whereas in the first edition of this Dictionary, I quoted this passage, according to my own translation, from the Italian, in this I give it according to the words of the original,

(b) See the remark [F].

(c) Taken from a Memoir imparted to the Bookseller.

(d) See the book of Mr Van Til, minister and professor of Divinity at Dort, intitled, *Het Voorhof der Heidenen voor de Ongeloovigen geopent*. That book is mentioned in the *Acta Erudit.* 1695, pag. 393.

(e) And not at Hamburgh, as it is in the title page.

(39) In the beginning of August, 1692.

(40) Religion des Hollandois, Letter iii, pag. 65, & seq.

(a) Called *Francis Vanden Ende*. Note, that Mr Kortholt, in the preface to the second edition of his father's book *de tribus Impostribus*, says that a young woman taught Spinoza Latin, and that she was afterwards married to Mr Kerkering, who was her scholar at the same time with Spinoza.

(38) *Purum, limidum, subtile*. See before the citation (32), *aliquid*, see above, citation (34).

(f) *Præfat.* O-
perum posthum.

Spinoza betook himself to the study of Philosophy, he quickly grew out of conceit with the common systems, and was wonderfully pleased with that of Des Cartes (f): He felt so strong an inclination to inquire after truth [F], that he renounced the world in a manner, the better to succeed in that enquiry. Not contented to free himself from all

(41) Of whom I have spoken in citation (90) of the article R A- M U S.

(42) The author of that answer was then minister and professor of Divinity at Nimeguen. He is professor at Groningen. His Latin name is *Braunius*, and has appeared in the title of several books.

(43) Pag. 158.

(44) Pag. 160.

(45) Ibid. pag. 161.

(46) Ibid. pag. 162.

(47) Brun, *Veritable Religion des Hollandois*, pag. 163.

(48) Ibid. pag. 164.

(49) In the remark [M].

original, such as Mr Des Maizeaux (41) did me the favour to communicate to me.

An answer to those letters of Mr Stoupp was printed in 1675. It is intituled, *La véritable Religion des Hollandois, avec une Apologie pour la Religion des Etats Genereaux des Provinces Unies . . . par Jean Brun* (42). The substance of what concerns Spinoza in that answer is as follows (43): 'I think Stoupp is mistaken, when he says, *that Spinoza has not abjured the Jewish religion*, since he has not only renounced the opinions of the Jews, having forsaken all their practices and ceremonies; but also eats and drinks every thing that is set before him, be it even swine's flesh, or wine come from the Pope's cellar, without enquiring whether it be *Cascher* or *Nefech*. It is true, he professes no other religion, and he seems to be very indifferent for all religions, unless God moves his heart. I shall not enquire whether he maintains all the opinions which Stoupe ascribes to him; and it had been more edifying if Stoupe had said nothing of it: let him justify himself, if he will. Neither shall I enquire whether he is the author of the book, intituled, *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*. However I am assured that he does not own it; and if we may believe the title-page, it has been printed at Hamburg, and not in these provinces. But suppose this wicked book had been printed in Holland; the States endeavoured to stifle it in it's birth, they have condemned it, and have prohibited the sale of it by a public decree, as soon as it came out in their country, as Stoupe himself confesses, pag. 67. I know it has been sold in England, in Germany, and France, and even in Swisserland as well as in Holland; but I do not know whether it has been prohibited in those countries. The States, whilst I am writing this, express their piety by forbidding that book again, with many others of the same stamp.' As for what concerns the reproaches and complaints, that this book had not been confuted, the author answers, 1. (44), That since it has been printed at Hamburg, at least according to the title, Stoupp should rather complain of the Divines of that city, than of the Dutch. 2. (45) That since that pernicious book tends to the subversion of Christianity, the Roman Catholics and the Lutherans were no less obliged to confute it than the Reformed, and among the Reformed, the Divines of Germany, France, England, and Swisserland, should have done their duty in that respect as well as the Dutch Divines. 3. That Mr Stoupe may be blamed for the same thing. Why did he not answer it himself? 4. (46) That Spinoza's book is not more pernicious than his; for, if the first teaches Atheism openly, the other does it covertly: both of them shew the same indifference for religion. An enemy, who attacks us privately, and under the appearance of friendship, is much more dangerous than an open enemy. It is necessary to cry out against a private enemy, that every body may know of it, whereas every body stands upon his guard against a professed enemy. Perhaps, this is the reason why the Divines of Holland and Swisserland have been of opinion that there was no necessity to make a speedy answer to Spinoza, believing that the horror of his doctrine is a sufficient confutation of it; the more, because there is nothing new in that treatise, what is contained in it having been a thousand times repeated by prophane men, and yet, thanks be to God, the Church has received no great harm by it. 5. (47), That he (John Brun) has written several remarks upon that execrable book, which, perhaps, he would have published, had not the war prevented it: Tho', says he, *I think I have spent my time much better upon some other works: nay, I never took Spinoza's book to be so pernicious as the defamatory libel of Stoupe's*. 6. (48) That, in fine, Spinoza's tract has been confuted in Holland by an excellent man, who was a very good Divine, and a great Philosopher, viz. by the late Mr Mansfeldt, Professor at Utrecht. Doubtless that confutation had been sooner published, had not the author been prevented by death. And I do not question that others would have confuted it long ago, had not Stoupe, and his accomplices, hindered it by this bloody war. I shall set down below (49)

the titles of some other answers to that book of Spinoza.

[E] *What he says of him, is not always true.* Does he not say, that, according to Spinoza, religions have been invented to induce men to the practice of virtue, not in hopes of being rewarded in another world, but because virtue is an excellent thing in itself, and profitable in this life? Is it not certain that this Atheist had no such thoughts, and that he could not have argued thus without making himself ridiculous? All the religions in the world, both the true and the false ones, turn upon this great hinge, That there is an invisible Judge, who rewards and punishes after this life, as well the outward, as the inward actions of men. The great use of religion is supposed to derive from that; and if religion had been invented, this had been the chief motive of the contrivers of it. It is plain enough that in this life good actions do not generally procure temporal advantages to men, and that bad ones are the most usual and most effectual way to wealth and power; and therefore in order to inspire men with the love of virtue, and prevent their running into vice, it had been necessary to propose to them rewards and punishments after this life. This is the craft which the libertines ascribe to those, whom they pretend to have been the first contrivers of religion. This is what Spinoza should have believed, and doubtless he believed it; and therefore Mr Soupp did not understand him in that respect, but took him in the quite contrary sense to what he meant. I wonder this fault was left in the Supplement to Moreri's Dictionary, in an article that bears Mr Simon's name. Note, that those who deny the immortality of the soul, and providence, as the Epicureans did, are those who maintain, that virtue ought to be followed by reason of it's excellency, and because the practice of morality is attended in this life with so considerable advantages, that we have no reason to complain. Doubtless, this is the doctrine Spinoza would have taught, if he had been so bold as to dogmatize publicly.

[F] *He found himself so strongly inclined to enquire after truth.* The proof of these words, and of several others in the text of this article, is to be found in the preface to the posthumous works of this author. 'Fuit ab ineunte ætate literis innutritus, & in adolescentiâ per multos annos in Theologâ se exercuit; postquam verò eo ætatis pervenerat, in quâ ingenium maturefcit, & ad rerum naturas indagandas aptum redditur, se totum Philosophiæ dedit: quum autem nec preceptores, nec harum Scientiarum Auctores pro voto ei facerent satis, & ille tamen summo sciendi amore arderet, quid in hisce ingenii vires valerent, experiri decrevit. Ad hoc propositum urgendum Scripta Philosophica Nobilissimi & summi Philosophi Renati des Cartes magno ei fuerunt adjumento. Postquam igitur sese ab omnigenis occupationibus, & negotiorum curis, veritatis inquisitioni magnâ ex parte officientibus, liberasset, quò minus à familiaribus in suis turbaretur meditationibus, urbem Amstelædamum, in quâ natus, & educatus fuit, deseruit, atque primò Renoburgum, deinde Voorburgum, & tandem Hagam Comitatus habitatum concessit, ubi etiam IX Kalend. Martii anno supra millesimum & sexcentisimum septuagesimo septimo ex Pthisi hanc vitam reliquit, postquam annum ætatis quadragesimum quartum excessisset. Nec tantum in veritate perquirendâ totus fuit, sed etiam se speciatim in Opticis & vitris, quæ Telescopiis ac Microscopiis inservire possent, tornandis, poliendisque exercuit; & nisi mors eum intempestiva rapuisset, (quid enim in his efficere potuerit, satis ostendit) præstantiora ab eo fuissent speranda. Licet verò se totum mundo subduxerit, & latuerit, plurimis tamen doctrinâ, & honore conspicuis Viris ob eruditionem solidam, magnumque ingenii acumen innotuit: uti videre est ex Epistolis ad ipsum scriptis, & ipsius ad eas Responzionibus. Plurimum temporis in Naturâ rerum perscrutandâ, inventis in ordinem redigendis, & amicis communicandis, minimum in animo recreando insumpsit: quin tantus veritatis expiscandæ in eo ardor exarsit, ut,

all manner of business, he also left Amsterdam, because the visits of his friends too much interrupted his speculations, and retired into the country, where he meditated without any hindrance, and made Microscopes and Telescopes. He continued in the same course of life after he had settled at the Hague; and was so well pleased with meditating, and putting his meditations into order, and communicating them to his friends, that he spent very little time in any recreation, and was sometimes three whole months without stepping out of doors. Though he lived a very retired life, his name and his reputation flew every where. Free-thinkers resorted to him from all parts [G]. The Palatine court desired to have him, and offered him a professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg [H]. But he refused it, as being an employment little consistent with his great desire of inquiring into truth without any interruption. He fell sick of a lingering disease, of which he died at the Hague, the twenty-first of February 1677, being somewhat above forty-four years of age (g). I have heard say that the Prince of Condé being at Utrecht in the year 1673, sent him word that he would be glad to see him (b). Those who have been acquainted

(g) Taken from the Preface of his Posthumous Works. See the remark [F].

(b) See the remark [G].

ut, testantibus iis apud quos habitabat, per tres continuos menses in publicum non prodierit: Quinimò, ne in veritatis indagine turbaretur, sed ex voto in eâ procederet, Professoratum in Academiâ Heidelbergensi, ei à Serenissimo Electore Palatino oblatum, modeste excusavit, uti ex Epistola quinquagesimâ tertiâ (50) & quartâ perspicitur (51). - - - He was brought up

he was at Utrecht. For I have been assured that the Prince of Condé, at his solicitation, sent for him from the Hague to Utrecht on purpose to discourse with him, and that Stoupe praised him very much, and was very familiar with him (56).

(56) Brun, veritable Religion des Hollandois, pag. 164.

Having more exactly informed my self in this matter, I learned that the Prince of Condé was returned to Utrecht before Spinoza left it, and that it is very true that he discoursed with that author.

[H] The Palatine court . . . offered him a professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg.] M. Chevreau says thereupon a thing that wants to be rectified. 'Being at the court of the Elector Palatine, says he (57), I gave a good character of Spinoza, though I then knew that Protestant Jew only by the first (58) and second parts of Des Cartes's Philosophy, printed at Amsterdam for John Rieuwertz in 1663. The Elector had that book; and after I had read some chapters of it to him, he resolved to call him to his university of Heidelberg to teach Philosophy, on condition that he should not dogmatize. Mr Fabricius, who was then professor of Divinity, was ordered to write to him; and though Spinoza was not in very good circumstances, yet he refused to accept that honourable employment. The reasons of his refusal were enquired into; and I conjectured from some letters I received from the Hague and Amsterdam, that these words, on condition that he should not dogmatize, had frightened him'. M Chevreau is mistaken as to the condition that he should not dogmatize, and Mr Bernard rightly observes that it had been a contradiction. These are his words, 'One may very well wonder, that since Spinoza was already so well known, the Elector should have been willing to entrust him with the care of teaching young people Philosophy, and much more to require from him that he should not dogmatize; for since his impious doctrine was built upon the grounds and principles of his Philosophy, how could he have taught Philosophy without instilling his poisonous errors? Such a proposal, together with the law imposed on him, implied a kind of contradiction (59)'. It is certain,

(57) Chevræana, Tom. ii. pag. 99, 100. Dutch Edit.

(58) To speak like an orthodox, Mr Chevreau should have said, because I only knew that Protestant Jew by the first, &c.

(59) Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, for September, 1700, pag. 301.

to learning from his youth, and for many years studied Theology; but when he came to greater maturity of understanding, he applied himself wholly to Philosophy; but neither his teachers, nor the authors of these sciences, answering his expectations, or being able to satiate his ardent desire of knowledge, he resolved to try the strength of his own reason. To further this design, the Philosophical works of the most renowned and excellent Philosopher Renatus Des Cartes were a great assistance. Wherefore after he had laid aside all sort of business and care of affairs, which greatly hindered his search after truth, that he might not be interrupted in his meditations by his acquaintance, he left the city of Amsterdam, where he was born, and educated; and after having often changed his residence, went at last to live at the Hague, where he died of a consumption in February 1677, in the forty-fifth year of his age. He also exercised himself in turning and polishing optic glasses for Telescopes and Microscopes; and, had he not been removed by an untimely death, greater things might have been expected of him, for he had sufficiently shewn his ability. But tho' he had altogether withdrawn himself from the world, yet he was known to many learned and honourable persons, for his great learning and capacity; as appears by the letters sent to him, and his answers. He spent much time in searching into the nature of things, and communicating what he had found to his friends, but very little in recreation: yea, he was inflamed with such an ardent desire of finding out the truth, that he hath not been seen in public for three whole months, as hath been testified by those with whom he lived. Besides, that he might not be interrupted in his pursuit of truth, he modestly excused himself from accepting a professorship, in the university of Heidelberg, offered him by the Elector Palatine, as appears from the fifty-third, and fifty-fourth epistles. The Theology he studied so long was that of the Jews. It is said that he was not well versed in their Literature, and in the critical knowledge of the Scripture (52). However it is certain that he understood Hebrew (53) better than Greek (54).

[G] Free-thinkers resorted to him from all parts.] I have named one in another place (55). I omit the rest, and I shall only say that the Prince of Condé, whose learning was almost as great as his courage, and who loved the conversation of Free-thinkers, desired to see Spinoza, and procured him a pass to come to Utrecht. He commanded there the troops of France. I have been told, that he was obliged to go and visit a post the day Spinoza was to come, and that the term of the pass expired before that prince returned to Utrecht: so that he did not see the author of the *Traктatus Theologico-Politicus*; but he had given orders, that, in his absence, Spinoza should meet with a good reception, and should not go without a present. The author of the answer to the book, intituled, *La Religion des Hollandois*, mentions this in the following manner. 'Before I leave this subject, I must needs say that I wonder Stoupe should so much inveigh against Spinoza, and say that he is visited by many people in this country, since he contracted such a strict friendship with him when

that this condition was not required from him, and that Mr Chevreau is mistaken in that particular: We may easily prove it by the letter that was written to him. Mr Fabricius, who was ordered to write it, promised Spinoza a full liberty of philosophizing; of which, adds he, the Elector thinks you will not make an ill use to the prejudice of the religion by law established. If you come hither, you will live a pleasant life, and such as becomes a Philosopher. *Philosophandi Libertatem habebis amplissimam, quâ te ad publicæ stabilitatē Religionem conturbandam non abuturum credit Hoc unum addo, te, si huc veneris, vitam Philosopho dignam cum voluptate transacturum, nisi præter spem & opinionem nostram alia omnia accident* (60). Spinoza answered, that if he had ever wished to be a Professor, he could not have wished for any other professorship than that which was offered him in the Palatine, especially on account of the liberty of philosophizing, which his Electoral Highness granted him. *Si unquam mihi desiderium fuisset alicujus facultatis professionem suscipiendi, hanc solam optare potuissem quæ mihi à Serenissimo Electore Palatino per te offertur, præsertim ob libertatem Philosophandi quam Princeps Clementissimus concedere dignatur* (61). I confess, that among other reasons for which he declares he does not find himself disposed to accept that professorship,

(60) Epist. liii. Spinozæ, pag. 562, Oper. posthumor.

(61) Ibid. Epist. liv.

(50) Mr Fabricius, professor of Divinity at Heidelberg, and counsellor to the Elector Palatine, wrote that letter to Spinoza, by his master's order, the 16th of February 1673. The following letter is Spinoza's answer to Mr Fabricius. Note, that he was then known to be the author of the *Traктatus Theologico-Politicus*.

(51) Prefat. Oper. posthumor. B. D. S.

(52) See the Supplement to Murer's Dictionary, at the word Spinoza.

(53) See at the end of his *Opera Posthuma*, his abridgment of the Hebrew Grammar.

(54) Tam exactam linguæ Græcæ cognitionem non habeo, ut hanc Provinciam suscipere audeam. Spinoza, in *Traктatus Theologico-Politicus*, cap. x. sub fin. pag. 136.

(55) See the article HENAU.

(i) Taken from the Memoir imparted to the Bookseller.

(k) Here is the title of that work: *Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiæ Pars I, & II, more Geometrico demonstratæ per Benedictum de Spino-*

acquainted with Spinoza, and the peasants of the villages where he lived a retired life for some time, do all say that he was a sociable, affable, honest, friendly, and a good moral man [I]. This is strange; but after all, it is not a more surprising thing than to see men live an ill life, though they be fully persuaded of the truth of the Gospel (i). Some will have it that he followed the maxim, *Nemo repente turpissimus*, and that he became an Atheist only by degrees, and that he was very far from being so in the year 1663, when he published the Geometrical demonstration of Des Cartes's principles (k). He appears as orthodox in that book upon the nature of God, as Des Cartes himself; but we must know that he did not then speak according to his persuasion [K]. There is ground to believe that the ill use he made of some maxims of that Philosopher, occasioned his Atheism. Some say that the pseudonymous piece *de Jure Ecclesiasticorum*, printed in

za Amstelodamensem. Accesserunt ejusdem Cogitata Metaphysica, in quibus difficultiores, quæ tam in parte Metaphysicæ generali, quam speciali occurrunt, Quæstiones breviter explicantur.

1665,

(62) Ibid. pag. 563.

fessorship, he says, he does not know within what bounds he must confine himself, that he might not seem to be a disturber of the religion established by law. *Cogito deinde, me nescire, quibus limitibus libertas ista philosophandi intercludi debeat, ne videar publice stabilitam Religionem perturbare velle* (62). But this does not prove that the condition mentioned by Mr Chevreau was required from him. This shews that even good authors are very apt to give a wrong account of a fact. Mr Chevreau should have been contented to say, that Spinoza was given in a civil manner to understand, that if he should impugn the principles of the Reformed Church, it would be taken amiss. Instead of which he uses a general proposition, importing a formal prohibition of dogmatizing: This is a perfect contradiction in the terms. However, it is certain that the clause inserted in the letter written to Spinoza, seemed very inconvenient to him: and this is what I meant to express in a general way, when I said, That he refused that professorship of Philosophy, being an employment little consistent with his great desire of inquiring after truth without any interruption; for he had reason to believe he should be continually interrupted, and that the divines of the Palatinate would make him lose a great deal of time in justifying to the prince what he should dictate to his scholars, or what he should say in his lectures. They would have found in them sometimes one thing directly contrary to the catechism of the country, and sometimes another indirectly contrary to it. Which would have occasioned many complaints and accusations: He knew not how far the thing would go, and therefore he could not be sure of living a quiet life; and though he had not fore-seen that it would make him lose a great deal of time, he was sensible that his meditations would be very much interrupted by the obligation he would be under of giving lectures at stated times, and by many other functions belonging to a professor. I desire my reader to join with this explanation, which has been published in the *Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres* (63).

(63) In December, 1700, pag. 689, 690.

(64) See the remark [I].

(65) Sebastian: he is professor of Poetry at Kiel, since the month of February 1701.

(66) Sebastianus Kortholtus, Præfat. Editionis 2. Tractatus Christiani Kortholti patris sui de tribus Impossibilitatibus.

[I] *He was a good moral man.* If you except what he told his intimate friends, who were very desirous to be his disciples, he said nothing in conversation but what was edifying. He never swore; he never spoke disrespectfully of God; he went sometimes to hear sermons, and exhorted others to go constantly to church (64). He did not care for wine, good cheer, or money. What he paid for his lodgings at a Painter's at the Hague was very inconsiderable. He minded nothing but study, in which he spent the greatest part of the night. He lived a perfect solitary life. It is true, he did not refuse the visits occasioned by his reputation; and that sometimes he visited considerable persons, not to talk of trifling things, or for his diversion, but to discourse of state-affairs. He understood them well, though he had no share in them, and guessed pretty right what course general affairs would take. I find all these particulars in a preface of Mr Kortholt (65), who in a journey he made to Holland, informed himself of Spinoza's life as well as he could. 'Vacavit interdum doctis & principibus viris, says he (66), quos non tam convenit, quam admittit, cum iisque de rebus civilibus sermones instituit. Politici enim nomen affectabat, & futura mente ac cogitatione sagaciter prospiciebat, qualia hospitibus suis haud rara prædixit Se professus est Christianum, & vel Reformatorem vel Lutheranorum cœtibus non modo ipse adfuit, sed & aliis auctor sæpenumero & hortator extitit, ut templa frequentarent, domesticisque verbi quosdam divini præcones maximopere commendavit. Nec unquam jusjurandum aut petulans de Deo dictum ex ore Spinolæ

exiit; nec largiore usus est vino, & satis duriter vixit. Ideoque hospiti quavis anni parte LXXX, aureos Belgicos tantummodo persolvit, & summum CCC, quotannis impendit. Auro plane non inhiabat. . . . He sometimes passed his spare hours in conversing with learned and considerable men, whose company he rather admitted than desired, and with whom he talked of political affairs. For he loved the name of a Politician, and sagaciously pierced into futurity, and foretold his friends several events. He professed to be a Christian, and not only went himself to the churches of the Calvinists or Lutherans, but likewise frequently exhorted and encouraged others to go to church and greatly recommended some preachers to his domestics. Nor did ever an oath, or indecent expression concerning GOD, come from the mouth of Spinoza. He used wine very moderately, and lived an abstemious life. Thus he paid his landlord only eighty guilders in the quarter, and spent about 400 guilders yearly. He was certainly not covetous of money.'

[K] He did not then speak according to his persuasion.] On the contrary, he believed then the same things which are to be found in his posthumous works, viz. That our souls are but modifications of the substance of God. This may be certainly inferred from the preface of the book, by any person who knows Spinoza's system. I shall set down the passage of that preface, wherein it is said, that having a scholar to whom he had promised to explain Des Cartes's Philosophy, he scrupled to depart ever so little from the opinions of that Philosopher, though he did not approve of them in several things, especially in what concerns the will, and human liberty. 'Cum Discipulum suum Cartesii Philosophiam docere promississet, religio ipsi fuit, ab ejus sententia latum unguem discedere, aut quid, quod ejus dogmatibus aut non responderet, aut contrarium esset, dicere. Quamobrem judicet nemo, illum hic, aut sua, aut tantum ea, quæ probat, docere. Quamvis enim quædam verâ judicet, quædam de suis addita fateatur; multa tamen occurrunt, quæ tanquam falsa rejicit, & à quibus longè diversam fovet sententiam. Cujus notæ inter alia, ut ex multis unum tantum in medium afferam, sunt, quæ de voluntate habentur. Schol. Prop. 15. part. 1. Principior. & cap. 12. part. 2. Appendic. quamvis satis magno molimine atque apparatu probata videantur: Neque enim eam distinctam ab intellectu, multò minus tali præditam esse libertate existimat. Etenim in his asserendis, ut ex *Dissertat. de Method. part. 4. & Meditat. 2.* aliisque locis liquet, tantum supponit, non probat Cartesius, mentem Humanam esse substantiam absolutè cogitantem. Cum contra auctor noster admittat quidem, in Rerum natura esse substantiam cogitantem: Attamen neget illam constituturæ essentiam Mentis humanæ; sed statuatur, eodem modo quo Extensio nullis limitibus determinata est, Cogitationem etiam nullis limitibus determinari: adeoque, quemadmodum corpus humanum non est absolutè, sed tantum certo modo secundum leges naturæ extensæ per motum & quietem determinata extensio; sic etiam mentem sive Animam humanam non esse absolutè, sed tantum secundum leges naturæ cogitantis per ideas certo modo determinatam cogitationem: quæ necessario dari concluditur, ubi corpus humanum existere incipit. Ex quâ definitione, non difficile demonstratu esse putat, Voluntatem ab intellectu non distingui, multò minus eâ, quam illi Cartesius adscribit, pollere libertate; quin imò ipsam affirmandi & negandi facultatem prorsus fictitiam (67). When he had promised to teach his disciple the Philosophy of Des Cartes, he religiously observed this rule, not to depart in the least from Des

(67) Ludovicus Meyer, Præfat. Renati Des Cartes, &c. Principiorum more Geometrico demonstr. per Benedictum de Spinoza.

Cartes's

1665, was the fore-runner of the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus* [L]. All those, who have confuted the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*, have discovered in it the seeds of Atheism; but none has done it so clearly as Mr John Bredenburg [M]. It is not so easy to answer all the difficulties contained in that book, as utterly to destroy the system

* Cartes's opinions, nor dictate any thing which either was not agreeable, or was contrary to them. Therefore let no man think that he here teaches his own opinions, or even such as he approves. For though he judges some things in this book to be true, and owns that he has added some of his own, yet it contains many tenets which he rejects as false, and which are very different from those he entertains. Of this I shall give one instance among many, in what concerns the Will, though that seems to be copiously proved. For he does not believe the will to be distinct from the understanding, much less does he believe it to be endowed with such a liberty. For it appears from several places in Des Cartes's books that in these assertions he only supposes that the human mind is an absolutely thinking substance; but does not prove it. Whereas our author admits indeed that there is in nature a thinking substance: but he denies that it constitutes the essence of the human mind, and lays it down that Thought, like Extension, is not determined by any limits. Thus, as the human body is not extension absolutely, but extension determined in a certain manner by motion and rest, according to the laws of extended nature, after the same manner the human mind or soul is not thinking absolutely, but thinking determined in a certain manner by ideas, according to the laws of thinking nature; which thinking is concluded necessarily to be in the human body when it begins to exist. From this definition it appeared to him not difficult to demonstrate that the will is not distinct from the understanding, much less that it has that liberty which Des Cartes assigns to it; nay even that the faculty of affirming and denying is fictitious. --- It appears from a letter of Spinoza (68), that he desired the author of the preface should use the advertisement we have just now read. From which you may conclude, that a Divine might have taken many thoughts and phrases from that book of Spinoza, without being heterodox. See the book, intituled, *Burmannorum Pietas* (69), printed at Utrecht in 1700.

[L] The pseudonymous piece de Jure Ecclesiasticorum, which was printed in the year 1665, was the fore-runner, &c.] Mr Dartis inserting in his journal some objections against a book of M. de la Placette (70), says that sincere men, who deprecate the ecclesiastical authority, and at the same time so much the more raise the temporal one . . . do not observe that they fall into the first snare laid by Spinoza, to open the way to his impious doctrine. This conjecture is grounded upon the date of two books published by that pernicious man, one in 1665, and the other, in 1670. The first is intituled, *Lucii Antistii Constantis de jure Ecclesiasticorum liber singularis quo docetur: Quodcumque Divini humanique juris Ecclesiasticis tribuitur, vel ipsi sibi tribuunt, hoc aut falso impieque illis tribui, aut non aliunde quam à suis, hoc est ejus Reipublicæ sive Civitatis Prodiis, in qua sunt constituti, accepisse*. The second is his *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*, which made a much greater noise than the first. The style and the principles of those two books are so like, that one needs only compare them together, to be fully convinced that they were written by the same author. And the bare reading of them is sufficient to show, that he has only discredited the authority of the Clergy in the first, and at the same time raised that of Kings and Magistrates, only to make way for the impious doctrines which he asserts in the second (71).

[M] All those, who have confuted the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*, have discovered in it the seeds of Atheism . . . but none has done it so clearly as Mr John Bredenburg.] I have already mentioned the posthumous answer of a professor of Philosophy in the university of Utrecht (72). To which I add, that a Socinian called Francis Cuper, who died at Rotterdam in 1695, intituled his answer to that book of Spinoza, *Arcana Atheismi revelata, philosophicè & paradoxè refutata*. It is a book in 4to, printed at Rotterdam, in 1676. Mr Yvon, a disciple of Labadie, and minister of the Labadists, at Wiewert in Friesland, confuted the same book of Spinoza, in a work which he intituled, *L'Impiété convaincue*, and published it Amsterdam in 1681,

in 8vo. It is said in the Supplement to Moreri's Dictionary, 1. That Mr Huet, in his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, and Mr Simon, in his book concerning the Inspiration of the Sacred Writings, have confuted the impious system contained in the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*. 2. That this *Traëtatus* has also been translated into French, and printed with this title, *Reflexions curieuses d'un Esprit desintéressé sur les matieres les plus importantes au salut tant public que particulier*. I add, that this translation, printed in the year 1678, in 12mo, came out with two other titles (73), as it has been rightly observed in the catalogue of the library of the Archbishop of Reims, and that the Latin original has been reprinted in 8vo, with several odd and chimerical titles, as the Booksellers thought fit, to deceive the public, and elude the prohibitions of the magistrates. I further add, that Father le Vassor (74) has very well confuted Spinoza, in his treatise concerning the true religion, printed at Paris, in the year 1688. See the *Journal des Sçavans* of the thirty-first of January, 1689; the *Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres*, and the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Sçavans* of the same year. Mr Van Til, a minister of Dort, wrote very good books in Dutch, to maintain the Divinity and authority of the Scripture against that impious man (75). The passage I am going to quote out of Mr Saldenus, a minister at the Hague, will inform us of the names of some other writers against Spinoza. That minister does not approve that Spinoza should be confuted in the vulgar tongue; he is afraid that persons curious, and lovers of paradoxes, will learn by that means, what it were better for them never to know all their life. 'Neque defuere, qui se abominandis ipsius Hypothesibus (76) voce calamoque opposuerunt. Hos inter fuere, Batelerius (77), Mansveldius, Cuperus, Musæus, &c. qui omnes an æque feliciter contra eum decertarint, non sine ratione à quibusdam dubitatur. Hos secutus postmodum est Guilielmus Blyenbergius (78), civis Dordracenus, qui idiomate etiam vernaculo confodere ipsum laboravit; licet nesciam, an consilio satis tuto; tum quod, quem oppugnat, Adversarius Sermone illo non scripserit, tum quod periculo vix careat, ne pestilentissimum impudentissimi Novatoris venenum, quod sub linguâ ignotâ latere hætenus plurimos poterat, Sermone vulgato in ipsum etiam vulgus, plus justo fere curiosum, & in paradoxo proclive, proserpat tandem & transeat (79). --- Nor were there wanting men who both preached and wrote against his abominable tenets; among whom were Batelerius, Mansvelt, Cuper, Musæus, &c. Some very reasonably doubt whether all these writers attacked Spinoza with equal success. After them appeared William Blyenberg, a citizen of Dort, who endeavoured to refute him in Dutch; tho' I know not whether this was safely done, both because the adversary whom he attacked, wrote not in that language, and because there is some danger, lest the poisonous venom of that impudent innovator, which, till then, might have lain hid from several people, in an unknown language, should, by being brought into the common language, creep, and diffuse itself among the generality of people who are too curious and prone to embrace paradoxes.'

An anonymous writer, who denoted his name by these initial letters, J. M. V. D. M. published a Latin letter at Utrecht, in the year 1671, against the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*. As for those, who have inserted in some books, which they did not write designedly against that tract of Spinoza, several things whereby they confute his principles, I cannot name them all, they are so many: I shall only point out two famous professors of Divinity, Mr Witzius, and Mr Majus, one in Holland, and the other in Germany, and Mr de la Mothe, a French minister at London.

I shall now speak of Mr John Bredenburg. He was a citizen of Rotterdam, who published there a book in 1675, intituled, *Joannis Bredenburgii Enervatio Traëtatus Theologico-Politici, una cum Demonstratione, geometrico ordine disposita, NATURAM NON ESSE DEUM, cujus effati contrario prædictus Traëtatus unice innititur*

(73) One of them is, *Traité des Ceremonies superstitieuses des Juifs tant anciens que modernes, and the other La clef du Sanctuaire*.

(74) He was then Father of the Oratory: He is turned Protestant since.

(75) See the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Sçavans*, for March 1696, Art. iii.

(76) See how he speaks of the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*, p. 23.

(77) He should have said Batelerius (Jacobus): his book was printed at Amsterdam 1674, and contains 103 pages in 12mo. It is intituled, *Vindiciæ Miraculorum per quæ divinæ Religionis & Fidei Christianæ Veritas olim confirmata fuit, adversus profanum auctorem Traëtatus Theologico-Politici*.

(78) I think he wrote against the Posthumous Works, and not against the *Traëtatus Theologico-Politicus*.

(79) Saldenus, in *Otiis Theologicis*, pag. 25.

(68) It is the ninth.

(69) Pag. 41, & seq.

(70) His book concerning conscience.

(71) Journal de Hambourg, Monday the 26th of October, 1694, pag. 133.

(72) Called *Regner de Manfucht*. His book was printed at Amsterdam 1674, in 4to.

system of his *Opera posthuma*; for it is the most absurd and monstrous hypothesis that can be imagined, and the most contrary to the most evident notions of our mind [N]. It seems as if providence punished in a particular manner the boldness of that

(80) It is a book in 4to, of 100 pages.

(81) He owns in his preface, that not being able to express himself in Latin, he had writ his book in Dutch and then had it translated into Latin.

(82) I have been informed just now, that Cuper did always deny it, and that he always protested that he found the demonstration among the papers of the Sieur Hartighvelt, whose heir he was.

(83) I have seen the tract he published at Amsterdam, in 1684, intitled, *Certamen Philosophicum propositæ veritatis divinæ ac naturalis, adversus J. B. principia, &c. It is in Latin and Dutch.*

(84) I have seen something of what he published in the same year under the name of *Latinus Serbaltus Sartensis*. It is a book in Latin and Dutch.

(85) See his third Dialogue at the end, or the extract of it in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, for August 1684, Art. VI, p. m. 605.

innititur (80). He set in a full light what Spinoza had endeavoured to wrap up and disguise, and made a solid confutation of it. The readers were surprized that a man, who was no professed scholar, and who had very little learning (81), should have been able to dive into all the principles of Spinoza, and to confute them so successfully, after he had represented them in their full strength, by a fair analysis. I have heard of a remarkable thing, *viz.* That this author having many times considered his answer, and the principle of his adversary, found, at last, that his principle might be brought to a demonstration. Whereupon he undertook to prove, that there is no other cause of all things, but a Being, which necessarily exists, and acts, by an immutable, unavoidable, and unalterable necessity. He followed the method of the Geometricians, and after he had drawn up his demonstration, he examined it all manner of ways; he endeavoured to find out the weak side of it, and could never think of any way to confute it, nor even to weaken it. Which made him very uneasy; he groaned, and sighed, he was angry with reason, and desired his most learned friends to help him to find out the fault of that demonstration. Nevertheless, he suffered no body to take a copy of it. Francis Cuper transcribed it by stealth, tho' he had promised not to do it (82). That man, perhaps, moved by the mutual jealousy of authors, for he had writ against Spinoza, and had not been so successful as John Bredenburg, made use of that copy some time after to accuse him of Atheism. He published it in Dutch with some reflexions; Bredenburg defended himself in the same language: several pieces were published on both sides, which I have not read, for I do not understand Dutch. Orobio, a Jew, who was an able Physician (83), and Aubert de Versé (84) engaged in that quarrel, and sided with Cuper. They maintained that the author of the demonstration was a Spinozist, and consequently an Atheist. As far as I have been able to understand by what I have heard, the latter defended himself, by alledging the common distinction between faith and reason. He pretended that as the Protestants and the Catholics believe the mystery of the Trinity, tho' inconsistent with the light of nature, he believed free-will, tho' reason afforded him strong proofs that every thing happens by an unavoidable necessity, and consequently that there can be no religion. It is no easy thing to drive a man out of such an entrenchment. It may be said that he is not sincere, and that is impossible to believe, as a truth, what is contrary to a Geometrical demonstration: but can this be said without setting yourself up for a judge in a case, wherein incompetency may be objected against you? Have we a right to decide what passes in other mens hearts? Have we a sufficient knowledge of a man's soul, to be positive that such and such combinations cannot be found in it? Have we not many instances of absurd combinations, and such as come nearer to a contradiction than that which John Bredenburg alledged? For it ought to be observed that there is no contradiction between these two things: 1, Reason teaches me that this is false; 2, And yet I believe it, because I am persuaded that reason is not infallible, and because I had rather follow an inward sense, and the impressions of conscience, in short, the word of God, than a metaphysical demonstration. This is not believing, and disbelieving at the same time one and the same thing. Such a combination is impossible, and no man ought to be admitted to alledge it for his vindication. However it be, the man I speak of made it appear that the sense of religion, and the hopes of another life prevailed in his soul against his demonstration; and I have been told that the marks he gave of it, during his last sickness, put his sincerity out of all doubt. The Abbot de Dangeau (85) speaks of some men, whose religion is in their mind, and not in their heart; they are persuaded of the truth of it, but their conscience is not affected with the love of God. I think it may likewise be said that there are some men, whose religion is in their heart, and not in their mind. They lose sight of it, when they make use of reason to come to the know-

ledge of it; it escapes the subtilties and sophisms of their Logic; they know not which way to turn whilst they proclaim the arguments *pro* and *con*: but when they leave off disputing, and mind only their inward sense, the instinct of conscience, the power of education, &c. they are persuaded that there is a religion, and conform their lives to it as much as human infirmities can permit. This was the case of Cicero: one can hardly doubt it who compares his other books with those *de Natura Deorum*, wherein he makes Cotta triumph over all the interlocutors, who maintained the existence of the gods.

Whoever desires to know the shifts and equivocations made use of by Spinoza to conceal his Atheism, needs only read Christian Kortholt's book *de tribus Impostoribus magnis* (86), printed at Kiel in 1680, in 12mo. The author has there collected several passages of Spinoza, and shown all the venom and artifice that lie in them. This is not the least curious part of the history and character of that Atheist. He quotes (87), among other things, his letter (88), wherein Spinoza complains that there was a report (89) that he had a book in the press to prove that there is no God.

[N] *The most absurd and monstrous hypothesis . . . the most contrary to the most evident notions of our mind.* He supposes (90) that there is but one substance in nature, and that this only substance is endowed with infinite attributes, and among others, with extension and thought. Afterwards he affirms, that all bodies in the universe are modifications of that substance, as it is extended; and that for instance, the souls of men are modifications of that substance, as it thinks: so that God, the necessary and most perfect Being, is the cause of all things that exist, but does not differ from them. There is but one Being, and one Nature, and that Being produces in itself, and by an immanent action, whatever goes by the name of creatures. He is at once both agent and patient, efficient cause, and subject; He produces nothing but what is his own modification. This is the most extravagant hypothesis that can be thought of. The most infamous things sung by the heathen Poets against Jupiter, and against Venus, do not come near the horrid notion Spinoza gives us of God. For the Poets did not ascribe to the gods all the crimes that are committed, all the infirmities of mankind; but, according to Spinoza, there is no other agent, nor other patient but God, with respect to physical and moral evil. Let us observe some of the absurdities of his system.

I. It is impossible that the universe should be the only substance; for whatever is extended must necessarily consist of parts, and whatever consists of parts must be compounded: and as the parts of extension do not subsist one in another, it necessarily follows that extension in general is not a substance, or that each part of extension is a particular substance, and distinct from all others. But, according to Spinoza, extension in general is the attribute of a substance. He owns, as all other Philosophers do, that the attribute of a substance does not really differ from that substance; and therefore he must acknowledge that extension in general is a substance: from whence it ought to be concluded, that each part of extension is a particular substance; which overthrows the foundation of the whole system of that author. He cannot say that extension in general is distinct from the substance of God; for should he say so, it would follow that this substance is in itself unextended: and therefore it could never have acquired the three dimensions but by creating them, since it is manifest that extension cannot proceed from an unextended subject, but by way of creation. But Spinoza did not believe that any thing could be made out of nothing. Again, it is manifest, that a substance unextended by it's nature, can never become the subject of the three dimensions; for how could they be placed upon a mathematical point? They would therefore subsist without a subject; and therefore they would be a substance: so that if this author admitted a real distinction between the substance of God and extension in general, he would be obliged to say, that God is composed of two substances distinct one from another, *viz.* of his unextended being, and of

(86) *Viz.* Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury; Thomas Hobbes; and Benedict de Spinoza.

(87) Christ. Korth. *de tribus Impostor.* p. 171.

(88) Written to Mr Oldenbourg, in 1675.

(89) Qui quidem rumor, ait, à plurimis accipiebatur. Unde quidam Theologi (hujus forte rumoris auctores) occasionem cepere de me coram Principe & magistratibus conquerendi. . . . Which report went among a great many people. From whence some Divines (who perhaps were the inventors of it) took occasion to complain of me to the prince and the magistrats.

(90) See among his Posthumous Works the piece intitled *Ethica*.

THAT according to Spinoza, God and extension are the same thing.

that author, by blinding him to such a degree, that in order to avoid some difficulties, which

of extension. Thus he is obliged to acknowledge that extension and God are but one and the same thing; and besides, as he maintains that there is but one substance in the universe, he must needs teach that extension is a simple Being, and as much compounded as Mathematical points. But is not this a most ridiculous assertion, and contrary to our most distinct ideas? Is it more evident that the number one thousand is made up of a thousand units, than it is evident that a body of an hundred inches is made up of a hundred parts really distinct one from another, each of which has the extension of an inch?

THAT extension is composed of parts, each of which is a particular substance.

It were in vain to raise any objections against our imagination and our senses; for the most intellectual and the most immaterial notions discover to us, with the utmost evidence, that there is a most real distinction between things, one of which has a property, which the other has not. The school-men have been very successful in showing the characters and infallible signs of distinction. When, say they, we may affirm of one thing, what cannot be affirmed of another, those two things are distinct: things that may be separated one from another, either with respect to time, or with respect to place, are distinct. If we apply those characters to the twelve inches of the foot of extension, we shall find a true distinction between them. I can affirm of the fifth, that it is contiguous to the sixth, and I can deny it of the first and second, &c. I can remove the sixth to the place of the twelfth; and therefore it may be separated from the fifth. Note, that Spinoza cannot deny that the characters of distinction made use of by the school-men are very just; for it is by these characters he acknowledges that stones and animals are not the same modification of the infinite Being. He acknowledges therefore, will they say, that there is some difference between things. He must needs own it, for he was not so extravagant as to believe that there was no difference between him and the Jew, who gave him a stab with a knife; or to say, that his bed and his chamber were, in all respects, the same being with the Emperor of China. What did he say then? He taught, not that two trees are two parts of extension, but only two modifications. You will be surprized that he spent so many years in forging a new system, since one of the main pillars of it was to be the pretended difference between the word *part* and the word *modification*. Could he expect any advantage from this change of a word? What signifies it, whether he declines to use the word *part*, and substitutes the word *modification* in the room of it? Will the notions annexed to the word *part* vanish away? Will they not be applied to the word *modification*? Are the signs and characters of difference less real or evident, when matter is divided into modifications, than when it is divided into parts? Not at all. The idea of matter still remains the idea of a compound being, of a system of several substances. This will be fully proved by what I am going to say.

MODIFICATIONS inconsistent, require distinct subjects.

Modifications are beings, which cannot exist without the substance they modify; and therefore there ought to be a substance wherever there are modifications; nay, it must needs be multiplied in proportion as modifications inconsistent one with another are multiplied: so that wherever there are five or six such modifications, there are also five or six substances. It is evident, and no Spinozist can deny it, that the square and the circular figures cannot be in the same piece of wax. And therefore the substance modified by a square figure is not the same substance with that which is modified by the circular figure. When therefore I see a round table, and a square table, in a room, I may affirm that the extension, which is the subject of the round table, is a substance distinct from the extension, which is the subject of the other table; for otherwise the square figure and the round figure would be at the same time in one and the same subject; which is impossible. Iron and water, wine and wood, are incompatible; and therefore they require distinct subjects. The lower end of a stake driven into a river is not the same modification with the other end: It is surrounded with earth, whilst the other is surrounded with water; and therefore they have two contradictory

attributes, viz. being surrounded with water, not being surrounded with water: and therefore the subject they modify must be at least two substances; for one only substance cannot be at the same time modified by an accident surrounded with water, and by an accident not surrounded with water. This shows that extension is made up of as many distinct substances as there are modifications.

II. If it be an absurd thing to say that God is extended, because, it is depriving him of his simplicity, and ascribing to him an infinite number of parts; what shall we say when we consider that this opinion reduces him to the condition of matter, the vilest of all beings, and such as most of the ancient Philosophers have placed immediately next to nothing. Matter is the stage of all sorts of changes, the field of battle of contrary causes, the subject of all corruptions, and of all generations; in a word, there is no being, whose nature is more inconsistent with the immutability of God. And yet the Spinozists maintain that it suffers no division; and the reason they alledge for it is the most frivolous and most silly cavilling in the world. They pretend that if matter was divided, one of its portions should be separated from others by empty spaces; which never happens. This is certainly a very wrong definition of division. We are as really separated from our friends, when the space that divides us is taken up by other men placed a breast, as if it was full of earth. And therefore when the Spinozists maintain, that matter reduced into ashes and smoky is not actually divided, they advance a thing quite contrary to our notions and manner of speaking. But what will they get, if we should lay aside the advantage we may draw from their wrong defining division? There will remain still many proofs of the mutability and corruptibility of the god of Spinoza. All men have a very clear idea of an immutable Being: They understand by that word a Being, which never acquires any thing new; which never loses what it is once possessed of; which is always the same, both with respect to its substance, and to the manner of its Being. The clearness of this idea enables us to apprehend most distinctly what a mutable Being is: It is not only a Being, whose existence may begin and have an end; but a Being, which always subsisting as to its substance, may successively acquire several modifications, and lose the accidents or forms which it once had. All the ancient Philosophers have acknowledged, that the continual series of generations and corruptions, which is observed in the world, neither produces nor destroys any portion of matter: hence it is, that they said that matter is ingenerable and incorruptible as to its substance, though it be the subject of all generations and all corruptions. The same matter which is fire now, was wood before; all its essential attributes remain the same under the form of wood, and under the form of fire: and therefore it loses and acquires nothing but accidents and modes, when wood is changed into fire, bread into flesh, flesh into earth, &c. And yet it is the most sensible and the most proper example that can be given of a mutable Being, and actually liable to all sorts of alterations and internal changes. I call them internal; for the different forms under which it exists are not like the different cloaths under which actors appear upon the stage. The bodies of those actors may subsist without any manner of change or alteration under a thousand different dresses: Cloth and linnen, silk and gold, are not united with the man that wears them; they are still foreign bodies, and outward ornaments; but the forms produced in matter are inwardly and penetratively united to it; it is their subject of inherence, and according to right Philosophy, there is no other distinction between them and matter, than what is to be found between modes and a thing modified. From whence it follows, that the god of the Spinozists is a Being actually changing, that goes continually through several states internally and really different one from another. It is not therefore the most perfect Being, *with whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning* (91).

Note, that the Proteus mentioned by the Poets, their Thetis, and their Vertumnus, who were images and examples of inconstancy, and which occasioned the

THE immutability of God is inconsistent with the nature of extension. That matter is actually divided into parts.

(91) Jam. i. 17.

which may perplex a Philosopher, he run himself into others infinitely more inexplicable, and

the proverbs whereby the oddest fickleness of men was denoted, would have been immutable gods, if the god of the Spinozists was immutable; for it was never pretended that there happened any alteration in their substance, but only new modifications.

(92) Horat.
Epist. I, lib. i,
ver. 90.

Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo (92).

What charm can hold this varying Proteus fast.

CREECH.

..... sæpe notatus

Cum tribus annellis, modo læva Priscus inani,
Vixit inæqualis, clavum ut mutaret in horas:
Ædibus ex magnis subito se conderet, unde
Mundior exiret vix libertinus honeste.

Jam mœchus Romæ, jam mallet doctus Athenis
Vivere: Vertumnis, quotquot sunt, natus iniquis.*

* Horat. Sat.
VII, lib. ii,
ver. 8.

*For Priscus with himself doth disagree,
Sometimes he wears no rings, and sometimes three.
He changes every hour his cloaths and gown,
Now takes the best house, now the worst in town,
And there he goes as nasty as a clown.
Now studies hard at Athens, now he'll come,
And turn gallant, and follow whores at Rome;
The most unsteady, fickle man on earth
As if Vertumna's self had rul'd his birth.* CREECH.

See below remark [CC]. If any reader wants here something to entertain him, let him read these Verses of Virgil concerning Proteus.

Verum, ubi correptum manibus, vincisque tenebis,
Tum variæ illudent species, atque ora ferarum:
Fiet enim subito sus horridus, atraque tigris,
Squamosusque draco, & fulvâ cervice læna:
Aut acrem flammæ sonitum dabit, atque ita vincis
Excidet: aut in aquas tenues delapsus abibit.
Sed, quantò ille magis formas se vertet in omnes,
Tantò, nate, magis contende tenacia vincla:
Donec talis erit mutato corpore, qualem
Videris, incepto tegeret cum lumina somno (93).

(93) Virgil.
Georg. lib. iv,
ver. 405. See
also Horace, Sat.
III, lib. ii. They
took it from
Homer, Odyss.
lib. iv.

*Thus surely bound, yet be not over bold,
The slippery god will try to lose his hold.
And various forms assume, to cheat thy sight;
And with vain images of beasts affright.
With foamy tusks will seem a bristly boar,
Or imitate the lion's angry roar;
Break out in crackling flames to shun thy snares,
Or hiss a dragon, or a tyger stares:
Or with a wile, thy caution to betray,
In fleeting streams attempt to slide away.
But thou, the more he varies forms, beware
To strain his fetters with a stricter care.
Till tiring all his arts, he turns agen
To his true shape, in which he first was seen.*

DRYDEN.

(94) Ovid. Me-
tam. lib. xi, Fab.
vii, ver. 221, &
seq.

(95) Id. ibid.
lib. xiv, Fab.
xvi, ver. 647,
& seq.

As for what concerns Thetis see Ovid (94): See also the same Poet concerning Vertumnus (95), and besides consult the fourth book of Propertius in the second Elegy.

THAT God can-
not be the sub-
ject of inhe-
rence of mens
thoughts, since
they are contrary
to one another.

III. We shall see still more monstrous absurdities, if we consider the god of Spinoza as being the subject of all the modifications of thought. The combination of extension and thought, in one and the same substance, is already one great difficulty; for the question is not about a mixture like that of metals, or that of wine and water, which requires only a *juxta-position*: But the combination of thought and extension ought to be an *identity*; thought and extension are two attributes identified with substance. They are therefore identified among themselves, by the fundamental and essential rule of human Logic (96). I am sure that if Spinoza had found the same intricacy in another sect, he would

(96) Quæ sunt
idem uni tertio,
sunt idem inter
se.

have thought it unworthy of his attention; but he did not much trouble himself with it in his own cause: So true it is that the most disdainful censurers of other mens thoughts, are very indulgent to themselves. Doubtless, he derided the mystery of the Trinity, and wondered that so many people should speak of a nature terminated by three hypostases; and yet, properly speaking, he ascribed as many persons to the divine nature as there are men upon earth. He looked upon those as fools who believed Transubstantiation, and who say that a man may be in many places at one and the same time, may be alive in Paris, and dead at Rome, &c. and yet he maintains, that the extended substance, though but one and indivisible, is all at once every where, cold in one place, hot in another, melancholy in one place, merry in another, &c. This by the by: but mind what I am going to say. If there is any thing certain and undeniable in human knowledge, it is this proposition: *Opposita sunt quæ neque de se invicem, neque de eodem tertio secundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo atque tempore vere affirmari possunt* (97). That is, two opposite terms cannot be truly affirmed of the same subject in the same respects, and at the same time. For instance, one cannot say without lying, *Peter is well, Peter is sick*: He denies that, and he affirms it: supposing, that the terms have always the same relation, and are taken in the same sense. The Spinozists destroy that idea, and falsify it in such a manner, that I do not know whence they can take the character of truth; for if such propositions were false, there is none that can be warranted to be true. And therefore it is vain to dispute with them; for if they deny this, they may as well deny any other reason alledged against them. I shall make it appear that this axiom (98) is very false in their system; and in order to it, I lay down first of all this undeniable maxim, that all the names that are given to a subject to signify what it does, or what it suffers, do properly and physically belong to its substance, and not to its accidents. When we say iron is hard, iron is heavy, it sinks into water, it cleaves wood, we do not pretend to say that its hardness is hard, that its heaviness is heavy, &c. This would be an impertinent way of speaking: we mean that the extended substance it is made of resists, is heavy, goes down into water, and cleaves wood. In like manner when we say that a man denies, affirms, is angry, is kind, praises, &c. we ascribe all those attributes to the substance of his soul, and not to his thoughts, as they are accidents or modifications. And therefore were it true, as Spinoza will have it, that men are modifications of God, we should speak falsely should we say, Peter denies this, he wills that, he affirms such a thing; for, according to that system, it is properly God who denies, who wills, who affirms, and consequently all the denominations, resulting from the thoughts of all men, do properly and physically belong to the substance of God. From whence it follows that God hates and loves, denies and affirms, the same things, at the same time, and according to all the conditions requisite, to make the rule I have mentioned concerning opposite terms false: for it cannot be denied, that according to all those conditions strictly taken, some men love and affirm what other men hate and deny. I go further still: the contradictory terms, to will and not to will, belong at the same time to different men according to all those conditions; and therefore according to Spinoza's system they belong to that sole and indivisible substance he calls God. It is therefore God who at the same time forms an act of will, and does not form it with respect to the same object. And therefore two contradictory terms are true of him: which overthrows the first principles in Metaphysics (99). I am not ignorant that in disputes concerning Transubstantiation, a cavil is made use of which might help the Spinozists. It is said that if Peter wills a thing at Rome, which he does not will at Paris, the contradictory terms to will and not to will, are not true with respect to him; for since it is supposed he wills at Rome, it were a lie to say he wills not. I leave them this vain subtilty, and I shall only say, that as a square circle is a contradiction, a substance is so too, when it loves and hates the same object at the same time. A square circle would be and would not be

(97) See Logica,
Conimb. in Ca-
put. x, Aristote-
lis de Prædica-
mentis, pag. m.
275, and the Lo-
gic of Burgerdus-
cius, lib. i, cap.
xxii, p. m. 127.

(98) That is, the
abovementioned
definition of op-
posite terms,
citation (97).

(99) Duo contra-
dictoria non pos-
sunt esse simul
vera: de qualitate
vera est affirmatio
vel negatio. See Aris-
tote's Metaphy-
sics, ch. iii, c. 1,
of the fourteenth

and so obvious that any man of a right judgment must needs perceive them. They who complain that the authors who have undertaken to confute him, have not been successful, confound

be a circle; which is a plain contradiction: It would be a circle according to the supposition, and it would be no circle, since the circular figure is wholly inconsistent with the square figure. I say the same of a substance, that loves and hates the same thing: it loves, and does not love it; this is a downright contradiction: it loves it, according to the supposition; it does not love it, since hatred does essentially exclude love. Thus you see what it is to be over-nice. Spinoza could not bear the least obscurity of Peripatetism, Judaism, or Christianity; and yet he heartily embraced an hypothesis, which reconciles two things so contrary to one another, as the square and the circular figures, and whereby an infinite number of inconsistent attributes, and all the variety and antipathy of the thoughts of mankind are made true and consistent at the same time in one and the same most simple and indivisible substance. We commonly say, *quot capita tot sensus*, as many men so many minds; but according to Spinoza all the minds or thoughts of men are in one head. The bare relating of such things is a sufficient confutation of them, and clearly shews they are contradictory; for it is manifest either that nothing is impossible, no not that two and two should make twelve, or that there are in the universe as many substances as subjects, which cannot receive at the same time the same denominations.

ANOTHER proof of what has been said, taken from the wickedness of man's thoughts.

IV. But if it be, physically speaking, a prodigious absurdity, that a simple and only Being should be modified at the same time by the thoughts of all men, it is an execrable abomination, if it be considered with regard to morality. How then? shall not the infinite, the necessary, the most perfect Being be steady, constant, and immutable? Why do I say, immutable? it will not be one moment the same; its thoughts will continually succeed one another; the same odd mixture of passions and sentiments will never happen twice. This is hard to be digested; but here is something worse. This continual changeableness will be very uniform in this sense, that for one good thought the infinite Being will have a thousand foolish, extravagant, filthy, and abominable. It will produce in it self all the follies, idle fancies, leud and unjust practices of mankind: it will be not only the efficient cause of them, but also the passive subject, the *subjectum inhesionis*: it will be united to them by the most intimate union that can be conceived; for it is a penetrative union, or rather a perfect identity, since the modification is not really distinct from the modified substance. Several great Philosophers not being able to apprehend how the most perfect Being can permit that man should be so wicked and so unhappy, have supposed two principles, the one good, and the other bad (100); but here is a Philosopher, who is pleased to make God himself the agent and patient, the cause and subject of all the crimes and miseries of men. If men hate and assassinate one another, if they form themselves into armies to kill one another, if the conquerors eat sometimes the conquered; it is a thing that may be apprehended, because it is supposed they are distinct one from another, and that *meum* and *tuum* produce contrary passions in them. But to affirm that men are only the modification of one and the same Being, that consequently God only acts, and that the same individual God being modified into Turks and Hungarians, there are wars and battles, is to advance a thing more monstrous and chimerical than all the deliriums of men shut up in mad-houses. Take particular notice, as I have said before, that modes do nothing, and that substances only act and suffer. This phrase, *the sweetness of honey pleases the palate*, is only true, as it signifies that the extended substance of which honey is made up pleases the palate. Thus according to Spinoza's system, whoever says, *the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks*, speaks improperly and falsely, unless he means GOD modified into Germans has killed GOD modified into ten thousand Turks: And therefore all the phrases made use of to express what men do one against another, have no other true sense but this, *GOD hates himself; he asks favours of himself, and refuses them to himself; he persecutes himself, kills himself, eats himself* (101), *calumniates himself, executes himself*, &c. This would be less incomprehensible, if Spinoza had represented God as a col-

lection of many distinct parts; but he reduces him to the most perfect simplicity, to an unity of substance, to indivisibility. And therefore he asserts the most infamous and the maddest extravagances that can be conceived, infinitely more ridiculous than those of the Poets concerning the gods of the Heathens. I wonder he either did not perceive them, or, if he did, how he persisted obstinately in his principle. A man of sense would rather chuse to grub up a piece of ground with his teeth and nails, than to cultivate such an offensive and absurd hypothesis.

V. Here follow two other objections. Some Philosophers have been so impious as to deny the being of a God; but they did not carry their extravagance so far, as to say, that if he did exist, he would not be perfectly happy. The greatest Sceptics among the Antients said, that all men have an idea of God, according to which he is a living, happy, and incorruptible Being, of a perfect felicity, and susceptible of no evil. Κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν, καθ' ἣν μακάριον τι ἐστὶ ζῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων, καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς κακῆ ἀνεπίδεκτον: Communem anticipatam homines omnes habent de Deo notionem, ex qua est beatum quoddam animal, ab interitu alienum, in felicitate perfectum, in quod nullum possit malum cadere (102). Happiness was the most inseparable property contained in this idea: those who deprived him of power and the direction of the world, acknowledged his felicity and immortal beatitude.

ANOTHER proof of what has been said above, taken from man's misery.

(102) Sextus Empiricus adversus Mathem. lib. viii, §. ii.

Omnia enim per se Divum natura necesse est
Immortali ævo summa cum pace fruatur,
Semota ab nostris rebus sejunctaque longe;
Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
Ipse suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira (103).

For whatso'er's divine must live in peace,
In undisturb'd and everlasting ease:
Not care for us, from fears and dangers free,
Sufficient to it's own felicity:
Nought here below, nought in our power it needs;
Ne'er smiles at good, ne'er frowns at wicked deeds.

CREECH.

(103) Lucretius, lib. i, ver. 57: The Epicureans ascribed to the gods whatever Homer ascribes to them in these words so often repeated: Μάναρες θεοὶ αἰὲν εὐντες. Beati Dii semper exstantes. --- The gods always happy.

Those who made him subject to death, said at least, that he was happy all his life-time. It was, doubtless, a horrid extravagance not to ascribe immortality as well as happiness to the Divine nature. Plutarch does very well confute this absurdity of the Stoics: I shall set down his words somewhat at large, because they prove a thought, which I have advanced above, and because they confute the Spinozists; for his argument is inconsistent with the hypothesis, according to which God is subject to death, as to his parts or modalities, that he is, as it were, the matter of generations and corruptions, that he destroys his own modalities, that he supports himself with that destruction, &c. Καὶ ἴσως ἐνύχοι τις ἂν ἔδνεσι βαρβάρους καὶ ἀγρίους θεὸν μὴ νοῦσι. θεὸν δὲ νοῶν, μὲ νοῶν δὲ ἀφθάρτον μὴ δὲ αἰδίων, ἀνθρώπου ἔδὲ εἰς γέγονεν. οἱ γὰρ ἄθεοι περσαγορευθέντες ἔτοι, Θεόδωροι, καὶ Διαγόροι, καὶ Ἰππωνές, ἐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν το θεῖον ὅτι ἀφθάρτον ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἐκ ἐπίσευσαν ὡς ἐστὶ τι ἀφθάρτον τῷ μὲν ἀφθάρτῳ τὴν ὑπαρξιν μὴ ἀπολείποντες, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὴν πρόληψιν φυλάττοντες. ἀλλὰ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν ἕρπυλιν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν αἴρα, τὴν θάλατταν, ἐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἀφθάρτον ἔδὲ αἰδίων ἀπολελοίπασιν, πλὴν μόνον τῷ Διὶ εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκονται τὰς ἀλλας. ὥς καὶ τέτω τὸ φθείρειν προσεῖναι τῷ φθείρεσθαι μὴ ἐπιεικέστερον. ἀσθερεῖα γὰρ τινι καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἕτερον φθείρεται, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰς εαυτὸ φθειρομένοις τρεφόμενον σῶζεσθαι. Ac fieri sanè potest, ut incidat aliquis in homines barbaros & feros, qui Deum esse nullum putent: deum esse qui existimet: sed eundem non securum interitus, non æternum, inventus est ne unus quidem homo. Certè qui athei appellantur quod negarent esse deos, Theodorus, Diagoras, Hippo: non ausi sunt dicere deum esse interitui

(100) See the articles MANICHEES, MARCIONITES, PAULICIANS.

(101) The fable of Saturn, who devoured his own children, is infinitely less unreasonable than Spinoza's assertion.

confound things: they would have the difficulties, under which he sunk, wholly removed [O]; but they should be contented to see his hypothesis entirely overthrown,

as

(104) Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, pag. 1075. A.

teritui obnoxium, sed non crediderunt aliquid esse ab interitu immune, ac talem naturam aliquam esse posse negantes, notitiam de deo reliquerunt in medio. Chrysippus verò & Cleanthes, cum implevisent (ut sic dicam) suis dictis cælum, terras, aërem, mare diis: nullum horum ab interitu liberum aut sempiternum statuerunt: solo Jove excepto; in quem reliquos omnes consumi putant; ut jam is perdat, quod nihilo est quàm perire melius. Est enim imbecillitas ut pereundo in alium transire, ita interitu aliorum in se transeuntium nutrirî atque servari (104). - - - And, indeed, we may happen to meet with barbarous and savage men, who believe that there is no G O D. But there was never found any man, who believing that there was no G O D, did not at the same time believe him incorruptible and eternal. For those who are called Atheists, such as Theodorus, Diagoras, and Hyppo, did not dare to say that G O D was corruptible; they, indeed, believed that there was nothing exempt from corruption, while they denied that no Being was incorruptible, they determined nothing concerning G O D. But Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled (as one may say) the Heavens, the Earth, the Air, the Sea, with gods, affirmed that none of these gods was incorruptible or eternal: they excepted Jupiter only, into whom they thought that all the other gods were dissolved, and they made him decay, which is no better than perishing. For as it implies a weakness and defect in one Being to perish and be dissolved into another, so it implies a weakness and defect in that other Being to be nourished and preserved by the former dissolving into it. But tho' this doctrine of the Stoics was never so extravagant, it did not deprive the gods of happiness during their life. Perhaps the Spinozists are the only men, who have made the Deity subject to misery (105). But what misery? A misery so great, that he falls into despair, and would annihilate himself if he could; he endeavours to do it; he deprives himself of as many things as he can; he hangs himself, he throws himself headlong down a precipice, being no longer able to bear the terrible melancholy that consumes him. This is not declamation; it is an exact and Philosophical language: for if man is only a modification, he does nothing: it were an impertinent, ridiculous, and burlesque, expression to say, *Joy is merry, sadness is sad*: it is a phrase no less impertinent in Spinoza's system, to affirm, *man thinks, man afflicts himself, man hangs himself, &c.* All those propositions ought to be affirmed of the substance, whereof man is only a mode. How could Spinoza think that an independent and self-existent Being, endowed with infinite perfections, is subject to all the miseries incident to mankind? If some other Being forced it to vex itself, and to feel pain, it's striving to make it's self unhappy would be less surprizing; one might say, it must needs obey a stronger power; it is likely it torments itself with the gravel, the cholic, a fever, and madness, to avoid a greater evil. But it is the only Being in the universe, there is nothing that commands, exhorts, or intreats, it. It is it's own nature, will Spinoza say, that moves it under some circumstances, to give itself a great deal of vexation, and a very violent pain. But I will ask him whether he does not find something monstrous and unconceivable in such a fatality.

(105) Their predecessors, whom I have mentioned in the first remark, have not cleared and dived into the consequences of their principle, as Spinoza does.

(106) You will find the sequel of these words of Cicero, in the remark [O], citation (112) of the article PYTHAGORAS.

THE system of Spinoza makes his whole conduct, and all his discourses ridiculous.

The strong reasons alledged against those, who maintained that our souls are a portion of G O D, are still more solid against Spinoza. It is objected against Pythagoras, in a piece of Cicero, that three palpable falsities result from that doctrine: 1, That the Divine Nature would be torn in pieces. 2, That it would be miserable whenever men are so. 3, That man's mind would be ignorant of nothing, since it would be G O D. Nam Pythagoras qui censuit, &c (106).

VI. Were it not that I remember I do not write a book against that man, but only some short observations by the by, I could find many other absurdities in his system. I shall conclude with this. He engaged in an hypothesis, which makes all his labours ridiculous; and I am sure that every page of his Ethics affords a horrid piece of nonsense. First, I would fain know whom he has in view, when he rejects some doctrines, and proposes others. Does he design to teach some truths? Would he confute some errors? But how can he say that there are any errors among men? Are not the thoughts of the common Philoso-

phers, those of the Jews, those of the Christians, modes of the Infinite Being, as well as those of his Ethics? Are they not realities as necessary to the perfection of the universe, as all his speculations? Do they not arise from the necessary cause? How then can he pretend that they want to be rectified? In the second place, does he not say that the nature, whereof they are modalities, acts necessarily, and always follows it's course; that it can neither turn aside nor stop; and that being the only nature in the universe, no outward cause will ever stop or rectify it. And therefore nothing can be more needless than the instructions of this Philosopher. Does it become him, who is but the modification of a substance, to prescribe to the Infinite Being what it ought to do? Will that Being hear him? And if it should hear him, could it be the better for what he says? Does it not always act according to the whole extent of it's power, without knowing either whither it goes, or what it does? Such a man as Spinoza would let his mind at rest, if he reasoned well. If it be possible, would he say, for such a doctrine to take root, the necessity of nature will establish it without my book: if it be not possible, all my writings will be insignificant.

[O] They would have the difficulties, under which Spinoza sunk, wholly removed.] I think it may be supposed that he run into these absurdities, because he could not apprehend either that matter is eternal, and different from G O D, or that it has been produced out of nothing, or that an Infinite Mind, perfectly free, and the Creator of all things, could produce such a work as the world. A matter that necessarily exists, and yet is destitute of activity, and subject to the power of another principle, is a thing that does not suit with reason. We see no affinity between those three qualities; such a combination is repugnant to the idea of order. A matter created out of nothing cannot be conceived, tho' we strive never so much to form an idea of an act of will, which changes into a real substance what was nothing before. This principle of the Antients, *ex nihilo, nihil fit*, - - - *Nothing is made of nothing*, offers itself continually to our imagination, and there appears with such evidence, that it stops us short, in case we have begun to frame any conception of creation. Lastly, that a G O D, infinitely good, infinitely holy, infinitely free, who could make creatures always holy, and always happy, should rather chuse to make them criminal, and eternally miserable, is a thing that shocks reason; and so much the more, because it cannot reconcile man's free-will

(107) with the quality of a Being created out of nothing. But unless those two things be reconciled, it cannot conceive how man deserves any punishment under a free, good, holy, and just Providence. These three inconveniencies put Spinoza upon looking for a new system, wherein G O D should not be distinct from matter, and should act necessarily, and according to the whole extent of his power, not out of himself, but in himself. It results from this supposition, that this necessary cause, whose power is not limited, and whose actions are not directed by goodness, justice, and knowledge, but only by the infinite power of it's nature, must needs have modified itself according to all possible realities, so that errors and vices, pain and grief, being modalities as real as truth, virtue, and pleasure, all those things must have been in the universe. Spinoza hoped to resolve by that means the objections of the Manichees, against the one only principle. Those objections have no force but on the supposition that one only principle of all things acts by choice, and can act or forbear acting, and confines it's power according to the rules of goodness and equity, or according to the instinct of malice. This being supposed, the question is, if that one only principle be good, whence comes evil? If it be bad, whence comes good? *Deteriora velle, nostri fuerit fortasse defectus: posse vero contra innocentiam, quæ sceleratus quilibet conceperit, inspectante Deo, monstri simile est: unde haud injuria tuorum quidam familiarium quæfivit: Si quidem Deus, inquit, est, unde mala? bona vero unde, si non est (108)? - - - To have a will to do evil, is, perhaps, our defect: but for a villain, in the sight of God, to do against an innocent man whatever he devises, is a thing monstrous. From hence,*

(107) That is, the liberty of indifference.

(108) Eccehæ, de Consolat. Philosoph. lib. 1, Prologo, pag. m. 11.

as has been done even by his weakest adversaries [P]. It must not be forgot that this impious

hence one of your friends asked, and not without reason, If there is a God, whence comes evil; and if there is no God, whence comes good? Spinoza would answer, my one only principle being able to do good and evil, and doing whatever it can do, good and evil must necessarily be in the world. But if you consider the three inconveniencies he intended to avoid, and the extravagant and abominable consequences of his hypothesis, you will find that his choice is neither that of a good man, nor that of a man of parts. He lays aside some things, of which, the worst that that can be said is, that the weakness of our reason does not allow us clearly to perceive the possibility of them; and he admits others, which are evidently impossible. There is a great difference between not comprehending the possibility of a thing, and comprehending the impossibility of it. Now see the injustice of the readers. They require from all those, who write against Spinoza, that they should remove the difficulties which perplexed him, and set in a clear light the truths he could not comprehend; and because they find no such thing in the writings of the Anti-Spinozists, they declare they have not succeeded. Is it not sufficient to overthrow the system of that Atheist? Reason teaches us that custom ought to be maintained against innovators, unless they bring in better laws; and if their opinions were not better than those that are commonly received, they would deserve to be rejected, tho' they were not worse than the abuses they intend to suppress. It ought to be said to those men, submit to custom, or give us something better (109). Much more ought we to reject the system of the Spinozists, since in freeing us from some difficulties, it involves us in more inextricable perplexities. If the difficulties were equal on both sides, the common system should be preferred to the other, because, besides the privilege of possession it hath also this advantage, that it promises us a great happiness for the time to come, and affords us a thousand comforts in the miseries of this life. How great a satisfaction is it in our adversity to hope that God will hear our prayers, and that, if he does not hear them, he will however reward our patience, and indemnify us in a glorious manner? It is a great comfort to flatter one's self that other men will have some regard to the dictates of their conscience, and to the fear of God. Wherefore the common hypothesis is both truer and more agreeable than the atheistical (110). Therefore since the system of Spinoza is not liable to lesser objections than the Christian hypothesis, it were a sufficient reason to reject it. So that any author, who shews that Spinozism is obscure, and false in it's first propositions, and perplexed with impenetrable and contradictory absurdities in it's consequences, ought to pass for having very well confuted it, tho' he does not clearly resolve all the objections of Spinoza. The whole matter may be reduced to these few words. The common hypothesis, if compared with that of the Spinozists in those things that are clear, has a greater evidence: and if it be compared with the other in those things that are obscure; it appears less opposite to the light of reason. And besides, it promises us an infinite happiness after this life, and procures us a thousand comforts in this; whereas the other gives us no prospect of a future happiness, and deprives us of confidence in our prayers, and of the advantage we may expect from the remorses of our neighbours: and therefore the common hypothesis is to be preferred to the other.

[P] As has been done even by his weakest adversaries.] I shall not set up for a master of the ceremonies, to place those gentlemen in their higher or lower ranks, but shall only name those who are come to my knowledge (111). Mr Velthuyse (112) published a book against Spinoza in the year 1680. It is intituled, *Tractatus de cultu naturali, & origine moralitatis*. Four years after, the Sieur Aubert de Versé put out a book with this title, *L'Impie convaincu, ou Dissertation contre Spinoza, dans laquelle l'on réfute les fondemens de son Athéisme* (113). Mr Poiret inserted in the second edition of his *Cogitationes de Deo, Anima & Malo* (114), a treatise, intituled, *Fundamenta Atheismi eversa, sive Specimen absurditatis Atheismi Spinoziani*. In the year 1690, a posthumous book of Mr Wittichius came out,

intituled, *Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen Ethices Benedicti de Spinoza, & Commentarius de Deo & ejus Attributis*. To which I add a Dutch piece, quoted by Mr Saldenus (115).

I add to these; 1. A Dutch book, published by the same Francis Cuper whom I have mentioned at the beginning of the remark [M]. This Dutch book is only a translation of what Henry Morus said in Latin against Spinoza in some passages of his works. It appeared very solid to Cuper, tho' his *Arcana Atheismi revelata* had been used with the utmost contempt by Henry Morus (116). 2. The book published at Paris in the year 1696, by Dom Francis Lami, a Benedictine. It is intituled, *Le nouvel Athéisme renversé, ou Réfutation du Systeme de Spinoza, tirée pour la plupart de la connoissance de la nature de l'homme*. You will find an extract of it in the *Journal des Savans* of the 28th of January 1697 (117). And you may see a just encomium upon it in the 101st page of the second part of the *Chevræana*, Dutch edition. 3. The work which Mr Jaquelot (118) caused to be printed at the Hague in 1697. It is intituled, *Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu, où l'on démontre cette vérité par l'Histoire Universelle de la première Antiquité du Monde, par la Réfutation du Systeme d'Epicure & de Spinoza, &c.* You will find a good extract of it in the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans* (119). 4. The book published by Mr Jens at Dort, in the year 1698. The title of it runs thus: *Examen Philosophicum sextæ definitionis Partis I Eth. Benedicti de Spinoza, sive Prodromus Animadversionum super unico veterum & recentiorum Atheorum Argumento, nempe una substantia; ubi infirmitas & vanitas argumentorum pro ea evincetur. Accedunt quædam necdum propofita argumenta pro vera existentia Dei*. It is a book of sixty-six pages in 4to. The author is a Physician at Dort, and the father of Mr Jens, rector of the college of the same town, and a learned humanist, and a good critic, as appears from his *Lectiones Lucianæ*, printed at the Hague, in 8vo, in the year 1699. I must not forget the Dutch book, published by Mr Van Til, in the year 1696, an abstract of which may be seen in the *Acta Eruditorum Lipsensium* (120). I shall speak below (121) of a Dutch piece, that is just come out.

You will find that the principles of Spinoza are overthrown in all those books; you will there find that from the very beginning of his work, he advances false propositions; and therefore, what he concludes from them afterwards can be of no force. Let him run as much as he pleases: what can he do by running much, if he loses his way from the first step he makes? Note, that his greatest admirers acknowledge, that if he had taught the doctrines laid to his charge, he would be an execrable man; but they pretend he has not been understood. 'Si igitur prædicti philosophi intentio vel opinio fuit naturam cum Deo hoc modo tam sædè confundere, judico illum ab adversariis justè impetum atque condemnatum, imò & memoriam ejus in omne ævum execrandam esse: attamen quia de alicujus intentione solus potest judicare intus cordium perscrutator Deus, nobis nihil aliud restat nisi ut judicemus de opinione quæ continetur in scriptis quæ memoratus vir in lucem emisit; & licet inter illius adversarios habeantur etiam perspicacissimi, puto tamen eos horum scriptorum verum sensum minimè assecutos fuisse, quoniam in iis nihil reperio nisi id quod abunde satis indicat hunc virum minimè confundere velle Deum & naturam: saltem ego ita judico ex ejus scriptis, quæ si alii melius intelligant, quæ dixi indicta sunt, patrocinium illius hominis in me suscipere nolo, peto duntaxat ut quod aliis licuit, id & mihi liceat, nempe ut exprimam quem puto horum scriptorum genuinum sensum esse (122). If therefore it was the intention of this Philosopher to confound GOD and nature together, in so shameful a manner, or if his opinion comes to that, I think he was justly attacked and condemned by his adversaries; nay, that his memory ought to be for ever execrable: but because GOD alone, who is the searcher of hearts, can judge of any man's intention, it only belongs to us, to judge of the opinions contained in the writings which this man has published; and though there are some among his adversaries of great penetration, yet I think they have not at all discovered the

(115) Above citation (78). The author's name was Blyenberg: he was a merchant at Dort, who died in 1696.

(116) Oper Philosoph. Tom. i, pag. 600.

(117) Page 72; of the Dutch edition.

(118) He was minister of the church of Vassy in Champagne, and is now minister at the Hague.

(119) For September 1696, Art. iii.

(120) Page 295, & seq. of the year 1696.

(121) In the remark [BB].

(122) Autor anonymus Specimenis Artis ratiocinandi naturalis & artificialis, pag. 113. Note that since the first edition of this Dictionary I have seen that Specimen Artis ratiocinandi, &c. with the author's name and picture. It is Mr Kufelaer. That book is ascribed to Spinoza himself, in Micraëlius's Historia Ecclesiastica, pag. 2260, Edit. 1699. I thought that Spinoza was still living in the year 1684, which is not true.

(109) Sin melius quid habes, accerfe, aut imperium fer. Horatius, Epistola V, lib. i, ver 6.

(110) I have already said in the article SOCI-NUS, (FAUSTUS), remark [I], that it is the interest of every one, that all authors be conscientious, and fear God.

(111) Note, that I speak only of those who have confuted the Posthumous Works of Spinoza.

(112) Being exhorted to it, and helped by the deceased Mr PAETS (of whom I spoke above, citation (12), of the article SANCTE-SIUS) to whom he dedicated it.

(113) See the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, for October 1684, pag. 862.

(114) At Amsterdam 1685. See the same Nouvelles, for April 1685, pag. 430.

(2) See his 11th and 12th letters.

impious man was not sensible of the unavoidable consequences of his system; for he laughed at the apparition of spirits (1), and there is no Philosopher, who has less reason to

(123) There is in the title *Hamburgi*, as in the *Traктatus Theologico-Politicus*.

(124) The Apologist I have quoted (viz. Mr Kuffelaer) maintains with might and main, in the 14th page, that there can be but one substance in the universe.

SPINOZA knew not that the word *idem* is sometimes used for *simile*.

‘true sense of his writings, because I find nothing in them, but what abundantly shews that he was far from confounding GOD and nature together. At least I judge so from his writings, which if others understand better than I do, I retract what I now say; I do not take it upon me to protect this man; I only ask that the liberty which is granted others, may likewise be granted me, which is that I may be allowed to explain what I take to be the genuine sense of these writings.’ These words taken from a book of one of his followers, printed at Utrecht in 1684 (123), clearly shew that Spinoza has been so successfully confuted by his adversaries, that the only way of replying to them, is like that of the Janseists against the Jesuits, viz. That his opinion is not such as it is supposed to be. This is the result of what his apologist says. And therefore in order to shew that his adversaries have attained a compleat victory over him, we need only consider that he has in effect taught what is imputed to him, or that he contradicted himself wretchedly, and knew not what he said. He is accused of teaching that all particular beings are modifications of GOD. This is plainly his doctrine, since his fourteenth proposition runs thus: ‘Præter Deum nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia: ----- Besides GOD no substance can exist, nor be conceived: And he affirms in the fifteenth, ‘Quicquid est, in Deo est, & nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest:’ ----- Whatever exists is in GOD, and nothing can exist nor be conceived without GOD:’ which he proves by this reason, that every thing is a mode or a substance, and that modes can neither exist nor be conceived without a substance. When therefore an apologist speaks in this manner: were it true that Spinoza teaches that all particular beings are modes of the divine substance, I would not deny that his adversaries have obtained a compleat victory over him; I only deny the fact, I do not believe that the doctrine they have very well confuted, is contained in his book: I say when an apologist speaks in such a manner, he had as good own that his hero has been defeated; for certainly the doctrine in question, is in Spinoza’s Ethics (124).

Here I must give an instance of the falsity of his former propositions; it will be of use to shew how easy it was to overthrow his system. His fifth proposition contains these words, ‘In rerum natura non possunt dari duæ aut plures substantiæ ejusdem naturæ seu attributi. ----- It is impossible that two or more substances of the same nature or attribute should exist.’ This is his *Argumentum Achilleum*, and the most steady foundation he builds upon; but at the same time, it is such a wretched sophism, that no scholar, who has read what is called *parva logicalia*, or the five *Predicabilia Porphyrii*, could be perplexed with it. All those who teach school-Philosophy, begin with telling their scholars what *Genus*, *Species*, and *Individuum* are. This lecture is sufficient to put Spinoza to a stand. The following distinction will do the business: *Non possunt dari plures substantiæ ejusdem numero naturæ seu attributi, concedo; non possunt dari plures substantiæ ejusdem specie naturæ seu attributi, nego.* What could Spinoza say against this distinction? Must he not admit of it with respect to modifications? Is not man, according to his notion, a species of modification, and is not Socrates an individuum of that species? Would he have us maintain that Benedict Spinoza, and the Jew, who attempted to thrust a knife into his body, were not two modifications, but one only? This might be proved invincibly, if his proof for the unity of substance was a good one; but since it proves too much, for it proves that there is but one modification in the world, he ought to be one of the first to reject it. He ought therefore to know that the word *idem* signifies two things, *identity*, and *similitude*. We say, that such a one was born the same day as his father, and died the same day with his mother. With respect to a man born the first of March 1630, and who died the tenth of February 1655, whose father was born the first of March 1610, and whose mother died the tenth of February 1655. The proposition would be true in the two senses of the word *same*. It would signify *like* in the first part of this proposition, but not in the second. Pythagoras and Aristotle, according

to Spinoza’s system (125), were two like modifications: each of them had the whole nature of a modification, and yet the one differed from the other. The same may be said of two substances: each of them has the whole nature, and all the attributes of substance, and yet they are not one only substance, but two. I shall set down what a Spaniard says against those, who, through a sophism like that of Spinoza, thought that the *Materia prima* did not differ from GOD. ‘Quis non obstupescat fuisse ullo tempore aliquos adeo desipientes, & in clarissima luce cæcutientes, qui Deum esse materiam primam & constanter asseverarent, & pugnaciter defenderent? At qua ratione tam stultam & impiam opinionem confirmabant? Si materia prima & Deus (inquiunt) non sunt idem, ergo differunt inter se; quæcunque autem differunt, ea necesse est aliquo differre, quare composita esse oportet ex eo in quo conveniunt, & ex eo in quo differunt; cum igitur nec in Deo nec in materia prima ulla sit compositio, nulla quoque differentia inter ea esse poterit; quare necesse est esse unum & idem. Vide quàm levi argumento in tam gravem errorem seu potiùs amentiam inducti sunt, non intelligentes discrimen quod est inter differens & diversum, quod etiam traditur ab Aristotele 10. lib. Metaphys. text. 12. Differunt enim inter se, quæcunque in aliquo conveniunt & in aliquo distinguuntur; ut homo & leo conveniunt in genere, quia uterque est animal, & distinguuntur per proprias differentias, alter enim est rationis particeps, alter verò expers: Diversa autem sunt quæcunque seipsis distinguuntur, quoniam sunt simplicissima (126). ----- Who is not surprised that ever there were men so stupid and so blind amidst the clearest light, as constantly to affirm, and obstinately maintain, that GOD is the first matter (materia prima). But by what reason did they support so foolish and impious an opinion? If, say they, GOD and the first matter are not the same, therefore they differ from one another. But whatever things differ, must necessarily differ in some properties, and therefore they must be composed of those properties wherein they agree, and of those wherein they differ. But there being no composition either in GOD or the first matter, they cannot differ from one another, therefore they must be one and the same. Observe how slight an argument leads those men into so grievous an error, or rather madness, who do not understand the distinction between different and diverse, which Aristotle has mentioned. Those things are different from one another, which agree in some properties and are distinguished in others; as a man and a lion agree in their genus, both being animals; and are distinguished by their proper differences, one being rational the other not. But those things are diverse, which are distinguished from one another, because they are most simple.’ There are few notions in our mind clearer than that of identity. I grant that it is confounded, and very ill applied in the common language: Nations, rivers, &c. are accounted the same nations, and the same rivers during several ages; the body of a man is accounted the same body for the space of sixty years or more: but those popular and improper expressions do not deprive us of the certain rule of identity; they do not blot out of our minds this idea: A thing of which one may deny or affirm what cannot be denied, or affirmed of another thing, is distinct from that other thing. When all the attributes of time, place, &c. which belong to a thing, belong also to another thing, they are but one Being. But notwithstanding the clearness of these ideas, it would be difficult to say how many great Philosophers have erred in that point, and reduced all souls and intelligences (127) to unity, though they acknowledged that some were united to bodies, to which others were not united. This opinion was so common in Italy in the XVIth century, that Pope Leo X, thought himself obliged to condemn it, and to threaten with severe penalties all those that should teach it (128). Here are the words of the bull, dated the nineteenth of December 1513. ‘Cum diebus nostris Zizaniæ seminæ tor nonnullos perniciosissimos errores in agro Domini seminare sit adsus, de natura præsertim animæ rationalis, quod videlicet mortalis sit aut unica in cunctis hominibus; & nonnulli temere Philosophantes

(125) Note, by the by, that by virtue of this principle, Quæ sunt idem uni tertio, sunt idem inter se, Spinoza cannot deny that Pythagoras and Aristotle were but one man. Erant enim idem uni tertio, nempe substantiæ Dei.

(126) Benedictus Pererius, de communibus Principiis, lib. 2, cap. xii, p. m. 359.

(127) See the article CESALPINUS, remark [C], and compare what is said of the Scotists in the article BELARD, remark [C].

(128) Omnes hujusmodi errores adfirationibus inhaerentes, veluti damnatissimas hæreses seminantes per omnia ut detestabiles & abominabiles hæreticos & infideles, Catholicam fidem labefactantes, vitandos & puniendos fore decrevimus. ----- We have decreed that all those who adhere to the restrictions of this kind of error, shall be deemed and punished as heretics, as every where detestable and abominable Heretics, and Infidels, who destroy the Catholic Faith.

secundum

to deny it [Q]. Spinoza ought to acknowledge that every part of nature thinks, and that man is not the most knowing and most intelligent modification of the universe; and therefore he must admit the existence of Demons. The dispute of his followers about miracles is a meer quibble [R], and a further proof of the unexactness of his notions

• secundum saltem Philosophiam verum esse asseverant:
• Contra hoc, sacro approbante concilio, damnamus
• & reprobamus omnes asserentes, Animam intellec-
• tivam mortalem esse aut unicam in cunctis homini-
• bus; aut hoc in dubium vertentes: cum illa
• immortalis, & pro corporum quibus infunditur mul-
• titudine singulariter multiplicabilis & multiplicata &
• multiplicanda sit. --- Whereas in our days a sower
• of tares, has dared to sow some most pernicious errors
• in the field of GOD, especially concerning the nature
• of a rational soul; namely, that it is mortal, and that
• there is but one soul in all men, and some rashly philoso-
• phizing, have asserted this to be true, at least, accord-
• ing to Philosophy. In opposition to this, with the appro-
• bation of the holy council, we condemn and pronounce to
• be reprobate all those who assert that the intelligent soul
• is mortal, or that there is but one soul in all men; or
• those who call this in question: since the soul is
• immortal, and according to the multitude of bodies into
• which it is infused, may be particularly multiplied, is and
• must be multiplied. This was lopping off a consider-
• able branch of Spinozism. I must observe, that some
• Philosophers do strangely confound the idea of identity;
• for they maintain (129), that the parts of matter are
• not distinct before they be actually separated. Nothing
• can be more absurd.

[Q] There is no Philosopher who has less reason to deny the apparition of spirits. I have said it in another place (130); when it is supposed that a most perfect mind has created all things out of nothing, without being determined to it by his nature, but by the free choice of his own good pleasure, the existence of angels may be denied (131). If it be asked, why such a Creator has not produced other spirits besides human souls? The answer will be, That such was his good pleasure, *stat pro ratione voluntas*: No reasonable reply can be made to this answer, unless the fact be proved, I mean, that there are angels. But when it is supposed, that the Creator did not act freely, and exhausted all his power without any choice or rule, and besides that thinking is one of his attributes, it is a ridiculous thing to assert, that there are no Demons. According to this system, it ought to be believed, that the thinking attribute of the Creator hath been modified, not only in the bodies of men, but also throughout the whole universe; and that besides the animals which we know, there is an infinite number of others which we know not, and which exceed us in knowledge and in malice, as much as we exceed in that respect dogs and oxen: For it were the most unreasonable thing in the world, to fancy that man's mind is the most perfect modification that an infinite Being, acting according to the whole extent of its power, could produce. We can conceive no natural connexion between the understanding and the brain; and therefore we ought to believe, that a creature without brain may as well think, as a creature organized as we are. What is it then that could move Spinoza to deny what is said of spirits (132)? Why did he believe that there is nothing in the world, that can excite in our machines the sight of a spectre, make a noise in a room, and produce all the magical phenomena mentioned in books? Was it because he believed that no Being can produce such effects unless it has as bulky a body as that of man; and that therefore the Demons could not subsist in the air, nor come into our houses, nor steal away from our sight? But such a thought would be ridiculous: the bulk of flesh of which we are made up, is rather an obstacle than a help to wit and power. I mean a mediate power, or the faculty of applying the most proper instruments for the production of great effects. The most surprising actions of men arise from that faculty; as it appears from thousands of examples. An Engineer as little as a dwarf, lean, and pale, performs more things than two thousand savages, stronger than Milo, are able to perform. An animate machine a thousand times smaller than an ant, might produce greater effects than an elephant; it might discover the insensible parts of plants and animals, and place itself upon the seat of the first springs of our brain, and open some valves, by which

means we might see phantoms, hear a noise, &c. (133). If Physicians knew the first fibres, and the first combinations of the parts in vegetables, minerals, and animals, they would also know the instruments proper to put them out of order, and might apply those instruments in such a manner as to place those parts in a new order, whereby good meat would be turned into poison, and poison into good meat. Such Physicians would be incomparably more knowing than Hippocrates; and were they little enough to get into the brain and the entrails, they might cure any body, and also produce whenever they pleased the most strange diseases that can be seen. The whole may be brought to this question, *Is it possible that an invisible modification should be more knowing and malicious than man?* If Spinoza denies it, he knows not the consequences of his hypothesis, and acts rashly and without principles. A man might make a long dissertation upon this subject, wherein he might prevent all Spinoza's subterfuges and objections. Compare with this what I have observed in the articles of Lucretius (134), and in that of Hobbes (135.)

[R] The disputes of the Spinozists about miracles is a meer quibble. The common opinion of orthodox Divines is, That God produces miracles immediately, whether he makes use of creatures as agents or not. In either case, it undeniably appears that he is above nature; for if he produces something without employing other causes, he does not want the help of nature; and he never employs them in a miracle, but after he has diverted them from their usual course: And therefore he shews that they depend on his will, that he suspends their power when he pleases, or applies it in a different manner from their ordinary determination. The Cartesians, who make him the immediate cause of all the effects of nature, suppose, that when he works miracles, he does not observe the general laws he has established; he makes an exception, and applies bodies quite otherwise than he would do, if he followed the general laws. Whereupon they say, that if there were any general laws, whereby God had engaged to move bodies according to the desires of angels, and if an angel had desired that the waters of the Red-Sea should be divided, the passage of the Israelites would not be a miracle properly so called. This consequence, which necessarily arises from their principles, makes their definition of a miracle less convenient than it were to be wished, and therefore it were better for them to say, that all the effects, contrary to the general laws we know, are miracles; and by this means the plagues of Egypt, and such other extraordinary actions related in Scripture will be miracles, properly speaking. Now, in order to shew the insincerity, and the illusions of the Spinozists upon this head, we need only say, that when they deny the possibility of miracles, they alledge this reason, that God and nature are the same Being; so that if God did something against the laws of nature, he would act against himself; which is impossible. Speak plainly, and without any ambiguity: Say, that the laws of nature being not made by a free Legislator, who knew what he did, but being the action of a blind and necessary cause, nothing can happen that is contrary to those laws. If so, you alledge your own position against miracles: which is a *petitio principii*; but however, you speak plainly. Let us bring them off from this general reasoning and ask them what they think of the miracles mentioned in the Scripture. They will absolutely deny all those, which they cannot ascribe to a cunning trick. Not to insist upon their impudence in denying such facts, I shall only argue against them by their own principles. Do not you say that the power of nature is infinite? But would it be infinite, if there was nothing in the whole universe that could restore a dead man to life? Would it be infinite, if there was but one way of forming man, *viz.* that of ordinary generation? Do not you say that the knowledge of nature is infinite? You deny that divine understanding, in which we believe the knowledge of all possible Beings to be reunited; but by dispersing the knowledge, you do not deny

(133) Note, by the by, that nothing can be more improper than to inquire whether angels, when they appear, assume a living or dead body. They have no need of it. They need only move the Optic and Acoustic nerves, as they are moved by the light reflected from a human body, and by the air that comes out of the mouth of a man who speaks.

(134) Remark [F].

(135) Remark [N].

(129) Sir Ke-nelm Digby does also maintain it, if I am not mistaken.

(130) In the article RUGGERI, remark [D].

(131) I suppose that the authority of the Holy Scripture is laid aside, and that a man declares he only reasons like a Philosopher.

(132) See his letters lvi, lviii, lx.

notions. It is said, he died fully persuaded of his Atheism, and that he took some precautions to conceal his inconstancy, if there should be occasion for it. [S]. Had he reasoned consequentially, he would not have treated the fear of Hell as a chimerical thing [T]. His friends say that, out of modesty, he desired that no sect should go by his

deny its infinity. And therefore you ought to say that nature knows all things, much in the same manner as we say that man understands all languages: one man does not understand them all; but some understand one, and some another. Can you affirm that the universe contains nothing, which knows the construction of our bodies? If you can affirm it, you contradict yourselves; you can say no longer that the knowledge of God is infinitely divided; the contrivance of our organs would be unknown to him. You must therefore acknowledge, if you argue consequentially that some modification knows it; you must acknowledge that it is very possible for nature to bring a dead man to life, and that your master confounded his ideas, and knew not the consequences of his principle, when he said (136) that if he could believe the resurrection of Lazarus, he would break his system to pieces, and willingly embrace the Christian Faith.

(136) I have been assured that he said so to his friends.

This is sufficient to shew that the Spinozists contradict their own hypothesis, when they deny the possibility of miracles; I mean, (to avoid all ambiguity) the possibility of the facts mentioned in the Holy Scripture.

[S] He took some precautions to conceal his inconstancy, if there should be occasion for it. I mean he took care, that in case the approach of death, or the symptoms of his illness, should make him speak against his system, no suspected person should be witness of it. The case is this; or at least we find the following account of it in a printed book (137). Perhaps it will be said that Atheists are not greedy of praise? But what can any man do more than what was done by Spinoza, a little before he died? The thing is of a fresh date (138), and I have it from a great man, who had it from good hands. He was the greatest Atheist that ever lived, and he grew so fond of certain philosophical principles, that the better to meditate upon them, he confined himself to a close retirement, renouncing all the pleasures and vanities of the world, and minding nothing but those abstruse meditations. Being upon the point of death, he sent for his landlady, and desired her not to suffer that any minister should see him in that condition. His reason for it was, as his friends said, that he had a mind to die without disputing, and was afraid that the weakness of his senses might make him say something inconsistent with his principles. That is, he was afraid it would be said in the world that his conscience, awakening at the sight of death, had damped his courage, and made him renounce his opinions. Can there be a more ridiculous and extravagant vanity, and a more foolish passion for a wrong notion of constancy?

(137) *Pensées diverses sur les Comètes*, num. 181, pag. 565, 566. See the *Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans*, for March 1689, pag. 82.

(138) *The Pensées sur les Comètes* were printed in the year 1683.

(139) In the remark [H].

(140) *Ad audiendum oratorem sacrum horis pomeridianis tendentem, finita, inquit, concione, Deo volente, ad sermones redibis.* Sebast. Kortbol-tus, Præf. Libri de tribus Impossibilitatibus, pag. 6.

(141) Id. ibid.

(142) Id. ibid.

A Preface, which I have quoted above (139), and which contains some circumstances of the death of that Atheist, says nothing of this. I find in it that he told his landlord who was going to church, I hope you will return, God willing, and speak with me when the sermon is over (140). But he died quietly before his landlord returned, and no body saw him die but a Physician of Amsterdam (141). For the rest, we are told in that preface, that he was extremely desirous to immortalize his name, and would have willingly sacrificed his life for it, though, in order to obtain it, he had been torn in pieces by the mob. 'Auro plane non inhiabat, alioqui delata sibi Professoris munera aliquoties non respuisset homo gloriæ avidior & nimis ambitiosus, qui vel cum Wittii amicis suis crudeliter dilacerari sublatius optavit, modo vita brevi gloriæ cursus foret sempiternus (142). - - - Surely he was not covetous, otherwise he would not have so often refused the Professorship which had been offered him, being a man desirous of glory and too ambitious, who would have wished to be cruelly torn to pieces with the De Witts, his friends, provided the shortness of his life was recompensed with immortal glory.'

[T] Had he reasoned consequentially, he would not have called the fear of Hell a chimerical thing. Those, who believe that the world is not the work of God, and is not directed by a Being simple, spiritual, and distinct from all bodies, must at least confess that there

are some things which are endowed with intelligence and will, and which are jealous of their power, which exercise authority over others, which command them to do some things, chastise them, use them harshly, and revenge themselves severely. Is not the earth full of such things? Does not every man know it by experience? It would be a thing altogether unreasonable to fancy that all Beings of that nature are only upon earth, which is but one point if compared to the world. Must reason, wit, ambition, hatred, and cruelty, be upon earth rather than any where else? Why so? Can any reason good or bad be given for it? I do not think so. Our eyes induce us to believe that those vast spaces we call Heaven, which have such powerful and rapid motions, may as well form men as our earth, and deserve no less than the globe we inhabit to be divided into several dominions. We do not know what passes there; but if we consult only reason, it will appear very probable, or at least possible, that there are thinking Beings in those vast spaces, which extend their empire as well as their light to our globe. Our not seeing them is not a proof that we are unknown or indifferent to them: Perhaps we are part of their dominions: they make laws, which they reveal to us by the dictates of our conscience, and are very angry with those that transgress them. The possibility of it is sufficient to make Atheists uneasy; and nothing but denying the immortality of the soul can make them fearless. For thereby they would escape the vengeance of those spirits, which otherwise might be more dreadful than God himself. I explain myself. There are some men, who believe a God, a Paradise, and a Hell; but they create illusions to themselves, and imagine that the infinite goodness of the most perfect Being does not permit him to torment his own work for ever. He is the father of all men, say they; and therefore he chastises like a father those who disobey him, and after he has made them sensible of their faults, he restores them to his favour in Heaven. Origen argued in that manner. Others suppose that God will annihilate the rebellious creatures, and will be appeased, and moved to compassion with a *quem das finem Rex Magne laborum* (143). What end of labours has your will decreed? They carry their illusion so far, as to think that the everlasting torments mentioned in the Scripture, are only comminatory. If such men were ignorant of the Being of a God, and by considering what passes in our world, should believe that there are Beings in other worlds, which concern themselves with mankind, they could not be easy when they come to die, unless they believed that the soul is mortal; for if they believed it to be immortal, they might be afraid of falling under the power of a cruel master, angry with them by reason of their actions; it would be to no purpose to hope to come off after having been tormented for some years. A limited Being may be destitute of all manner of moral perfection; it may be like our Phalaris's and Neros, a sort of men who could have left an enemy in a dungeon for ever, had they been able to get an eternal authority. Will they hope that mischievous Beings will not last for ever? But how many Atheists pretend that the Sun had no beginning, and will have no end? This is what I meant, when I said that some Beings might appear more dreadful than God himself? A man may flatter himself, when he considers that God is infinitely good, and infinitely perfect; and he may fear every thing from an imperfect Being: he does not know whether its anger will not last for ever. Every body knows the choice of the prophet David (144).

(143) Virgil. *Æneid*, lib. 1, ver. 245.

To apply what has been said to a Spinozist, let us remember that he is obliged by his principle to acknowledge the Immortality of the Soul; for he looks upon himself as the modification of a Being essentially thinking. Let us remember, that he cannot deny that some modifications are angry with others, put them to the torture, make their torments last as long as ever they can, send them to the gallies for life, and would make that punishment last for ever, if the death of one party or the other did not prevent it.

(144) Being to chuse either to be overcome by his enemies, or to be afflicted with a plague sent from God, he answered the Prophet Gad, I am in a great strait: Let us fall now into the hand of the Lord, (for his mercies are great) and let me not fall into the hand of man. 2 Sam. xxiv. 14.

Tiberius,

his name [U]. It is not true that his followers are very numerous. Few people are suspected of adhering to his doctrine; and among those, who are suspected of it, few have studied it; and among the latter, few have understood it, and most of them are discouraged by the difficulties and impenetrable abstractions that attend it (m). But the thing is this: at all adventures those, who have little religion, and do not much scruple to own it, are called Spinozists. Thus in France all those who are thought not to believe the mysteries of the Gospel, are called Socinians, though most of them never read Socinus nor his followers. For the rest, the same thing happened to Spinoza, which inevitably happens to all those who frame impious systems; they secure themselves from some objections, but they lie open to others that are more perplexing. If they cannot be orthodox, if they are so fond of disputing, it were better for them not to dogmatize. But of all Atheistical systems, none is less capable of deceiving than that of Spinoza; for, as I have said before, it is contrary to the most distinct notions of our minds. Objections throng in upon him; and he can make no answers but what are more obscure than the assertions he should maintain (n): and therefore, his poison brings a remedy along with it. He would have been more formidable, had he used all his skill to clear an hypothesis, that is very much in vogue among the Chinese [X], and very different from that which I have mentioned in the second remark of this article. I have been just now informed

(m) This is the reason why some are of opinion that he ought not to be refuted. See the *Nouvelles de la Rep. des Lettres*, for June 1684, Art. vi, pag. m. 388, 389.

(n) Consult his Letters: you will see that his answers have seldom any relation to the state of the question.

Tiberius, Caligula, and many others are examples of such modifications. Let us remember that a Spinozist makes himself ridiculous, if he does not acknowledge that the universe is full of ambitious, morose, jealous, and cruel, modifications; for since the earth is full of them, there is no reason to believe that the air and the heavens are not likewise full of them. Lastly, Let us remember, that the essence of human modifications does not consist in being clothed with a bulk of flesh. Socrates was Socrates the day of his conception, or soon after (145); whatever he had at that time may remain entire, when a mortal disease has put an end to the circulation of the blood, and the motion of the heart, in the matter wherewith it was enlarged: and therefore he is after his death the same modification as he was during his life, if we consider only what is essential to his person: death cannot therefore free him from the justice or caprice of his invisible persecutors. They may follow him wherever he goes, and torment him whatever visible form he may assume.

These considerations might be made use of to induce to the practice of virtue, even those who adhere to the impious doctrine of such sects; for it stands to reason that they should be chiefly afraid for having transgressed the laws revealed to their conscience. It is more likely that those invisible Beings would concern themselves with the punishment of such faults.

[U] His friends say, that, out of modesty, he desired that no sect should go by his name.] I shall set down the words of the Preface of his *Opera Posthuma*, without curtailing them. 'Nomen Auctoris in libri fronte, & alibi literis duntaxat initialibus indicatum, non aliâ de causâ, quam quia paulò ante obitum expresse petiit, ne Nomen suum Ethicæ, cujus impressionem mandabat, præfigeretur; cur autem prohibuerit, nulla alia, ut quidem videtur, ratio est, quàm quia noluit; ut *Disciplina ex ipso haberet vocabulum*. Dicit etenim in Appendice quartæ partis Ethicæ capite vigesimo quinto, quod, qui alios consilio, aut re juvare cupiunt, ut simul summo fruantur bono, minime studebunt, ut *Disciplina ex ipsis habeat vocabulum*; sed insuper in tertiâ Ethicæ parte Affectuum Definit. XLIV. ubi quid sit ambitio explicat. eos, qui tale quid patrant, non obscure, ut Gloriæ cupidos, accusat. - - - The two initial letters only of the author's name were put to the book, because a little before his death he expressly desired, that his name should not be prefixed to his *Ethics*, which he had ordered to be printed. And why he did so, it seems no other reason can be given, but because he would not have the Doctrine called by his name. For he says in the twenty-fifth chapter of the Appendix to the fourth part of his *Ethics*, that those who would help others to the attainment of the supreme good, together with themselves, will not desire that their doctrine be called by their name; and where he is explaining what ambition is, he plainly taxes such as do this with being ambitious of glory.'

[X] He would have been more formidable, had he used all his skill to clear an hypothesis, that is very much in vogue among the Chinese.] A Father of the Church owned a thing, which perhaps would not be excused at this day in a Philosopher, viz. that those,

who deny the Deity or a Providence, alledge probable reasons both for their cause, and against their adversaries. 'Deos nonnulli esse abnegant: prorsus dubitare se alii an sint usquam dicunt: alii vero existere, neque humana curare: immo alii perhibent, & rebus interesse mortalium, & terrenas administrare rationes. Cum ergo hæc ita sint, neque aliter fiat, quin sit unum ex omnibus verum, pugnant tamen argumentis omnes, neque singulis deest id, quod probabiliter dicant, si cum tuas res asserunt, si cum alienis opinionibus contradicunt (146). - - - Some deny that there are any gods: others say they doubt whether there are any: others that there are gods, but that they take no care of human affairs: and others affirm it, and say that they are concerned in human affairs, and administrate them. Since therefore these things are so, and one of all these opinions must necessarily be true, yet each of them contradicts the other with arguments, and does not want something probable to advance in its favour, and in refutation of the contrary opinions.' If he was in the right, perhaps it were chiefly with respect to those, who suppose a great number of souls in the universe distinct one from another, each of which exists by itself, and acts by an inward and essential principle. They are more powerful one than another, &c. Herein consists the Atheism so generally spread among the Chinese. The author of the following passage tells us how he fancies they have by degrees obscured the true notions. (147) GOD, that most pure and perfect Being, is become at most the material soul of the whole world, or of its finest part, which is Heaven. His providence and his power became limited, tho' of a much greater extent than the power and prudence of men. . . . The Chinese doctrine hath always ascribed spirits to the four parts of the world, to the stars, mountains, rivers, plants, towns, and their ditches, houses, and their hearths, in a word to every thing. They do not say that all spirits are good; they acknowledge wicked ones, which they take to be the immediate cause of the evils and miseries incident to human life. . . . (148) And therefore as the soul of man was, in their opinion, the cause of all the vital actions of man; in like manner they ascribed a soul to the sun, to be the spring of its qualities and motion. And because, according to this principle, the souls, that are dispersed every where, produced in all bodies the actions which appeared natural to those bodies, this was sufficient in their opinion to explain the whole œconomy of nature, and to supply the omnipotence and infinite providence, which they admitted in no spirit, no not in that of Heaven. It is true, that because it seems that man, using natural things for his nourishment and convenience, has some power over natural things; the antient opinion of the Chinese, which ascribed in proportion a like power to all souls, supposed that the soul of Heaven could act upon nature with a prudence, and a power incomparably greater than the prudence and power of men. But at the same time, they acknowledged in the soul of every thing an inward power, independent by its own nature of the power of Heaven, and acting

(146) Arnobius adversus Gentes, lib. ii, pag. m. 82.

(147) La Loubere, Relation de Siam, Tom. i, ch. xxiii, num. 2, pag. 503, 504. See above the citation (55) of the article MALHERBE, and the article SOMMONA-CODOM, remark [A].

(148) La Loubere, ibid. num. iii, pag 505, 506.

(o) See the remark [I].

(p) Vigneul Marville Mélanges, Tom. ii, pag. 320, Dutch Edit.

(q) I understand by that word the defects, which do not proceed from Spinoza's asserting things contrary to the maxims which other Philosophers generally acknowledge to be true.

(r) See Wittichius's Anti-Spinoza, or the Extracts of them in the Acta Eruditor. 1690, pag. 346, & seq. and in the 23d volume of the Bibliotheca Universelle, pag. 323, & seq.

(149) See the anonymous book printed in the year 1690, at Amsterdam, and intitled, *Philosophia vulgaris refutata*

(150) At Amsterdam. The title amounts to this, A Catholic and Christian Confession of Faith, in a letter to N. N. by Jarig Jellis.

informed of a pretty curious particular, viz. That after he had forsaken Judaism, he publicly professed Christianity, and frequented the assemblies of the Mennonites, or those of the Arminians of Amsterdam (o). Nay he approved a confession of faith communicated to him by an intimate friend [Y].

What is said of him in the continuation of the Menagiana is so false [Z], that I wonder Menage's friends did not perceive it. Mr de Vigneul Marville would have advised them to leave it out, had he been concerned in the edition of that work; for he has acquainted the public, *that there is reason to doubt of the truth of that fact* (p). The reasons he alledges for his doubt are very reasonable: he would not have been too forward, had he positively denied the thing. I shall take notice of a mistake he has committed in the same page [AA]. I must say something concerning the objections I have proposed against the system of Spinoza. I might add a very large supplement to those objections, did I not perceive that they are already too long, considering the nature of my work: this is not a proper place to engage in a formal dispute; it is sufficient for my design to make some general observations in order to undermine the foundations of Spinozism, and to shew that it is a system grounded upon such a strange supposition, that it overthrows most of the common notions, which are the rule of Philosophical discussions. Whoever shews that this system is contrary to the most evident, and the most universal axioms we have had hitherto, does certainly go the right way to confute it, though perhaps it is not so proper to reclaim the old Spinozists, as if it was proved to them that the propositions of Spinoza are contrary to one another. They would be more sensible of their prejudices, were they forced to confess that he does not always agree with himself, that his proofs are wrong, that he does not prove what wants to be proved, that his conclusions are not just, &c. This method of confuting him by shewing the absolute defects (q) of his work, and the relative defects of its parts compared one with another, has been well managed by some of those who wrote against him (r). I have been just now

'acting sometimes against the designs of Heaven. Heaven governed nature as a potent king, whom the other souls were to obey, and they were generally forced to it; but some of them did sometimes exempt themselves from it.' I confess, it is an absurd thing to suppose several eternal Beings, independent one of another, and of an unequal power; nevertheless, this supposition appeared true to Democritus, Epicurus, and several other great Philosophers. They admitted an infinite quantity of small bodies of different figure, uncreated, self-moving, &c. This opinion is still very common in the East (149). Those who admit the eternity of matter, are not more reasonable than if they admitted the eternity of an infinite number of atoms; for if there can be two Beings co-eternal and independent as to their existence, there may be a hundred thousand millions, and so *in infinitum*. Nay, they ought to say that the number of them is actually infinite; for matter, though never so small, contains distinct parts. And it is to be observed that all the Antients were ignorant of the creation of matter; for they never departed from the axiom, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. And therefore they were not sensible that it is an absurd thing, to acknowledge an infinity of substances co-eternal, and independent one of another as to existence. However absurd that Hypothesis may be, it is not liable to the frightful inconveniencies of Spinozism. It would account for many phenomena, by assigning to every thing an active principle, a more powerful one to some, and a less powerful to others; or if their power was equal, it might be said that those which prevail have a greater combination. I do not know whether any Socinian did ever say or believe, that the souls of men, not being made out of nothing, exist, and act of themselves. Their liberty of indifference would manifestly flow from thence.

[Y] He even approved a confession of faith communicated to him by an intimate friend. One Jarig Jellis, his intimate friend, being suspected of heterodoxy, thought himself obliged to publish a confession of his faith for his vindication. Having composed it, he sent it to Spinoza, and desired him to write to him his opinion of it. Spinoza made answer, that he had read it with pleasure, and found nothing in it that wanted to be altered. *Domine ac amice Clarissime: scripta tua ad me missa cum voluptate perlegi, ac talia inveni ut nihil in illis mutare possim.* That confession of faith is in Dutch, and was printed in the year 1684 (150).

[Z] What is said of him in the continuation of the Menagiana is false. The story runs thus: 'I have heard that Spinoza died for fear of being sent to the Bastille. He came into France at the solicitation of

two persons of quality, who desired to see him. Mr de Pomponne was informed of it; and being a minister very zealous for religion, he did not think it proper to suffer Spinoza in France, where he might have done a great deal of mischief; and to prevent it, he resolved to send him to the Bastille. Spinoza having notice of it, made his escape in the disguise of a Cordelier; but I do not warrant the truth of this last circumstance. What is certain is, that many persons, who saw him, have told me that he was a little man, of a yellowish complexion, that he had something dismal in his looks, and something ominous in his face (151). The last part of this passage is, I believe, very true; for, besides that Spinoza was originally come from Portugal or Spain, as his name sufficiently shews, I have heard some persons, who had seen him, say the same thing of his complexion, as is related in the Menagiana. But the first part of this story is a wretched falsity: from whence one may judge how many lies are told in such assemblies as Mr Menage's *Mercuriales*, whereof there are many at Paris and in other cities.

[AA] I shall take notice of a fault Mr de Vigneul Marville has committed. The Jew, or rather the Atheist, mentioned by Huetius in the preface of his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, without naming him, who occasioned his writing that learned book, is the famous Benedict Spinoza, with whom he had some warm conversations about religion at Amsterdam (152). The Jew, with whom Huetius had some conferences at Amsterdam, is *Manasses Ben Israel*, whom he hath named in the Latin poem of his journey into Sweden.

Altera lux spectare dedis mysteria gentis
Judææ, ductor Judæus & ipse Manasses.
Ast adducta secans dirus præputia culter
Dum tenet attentum, & sublatis infania ritus,
Ecce abaci; quo inferre pii cælestia Mosis
Scripta solent, summo extremum limbum pede tango
Inscius; insueto cuncti fremuere tumultu:
Diffugio veritus damnosæ vulnera cultri (153).

Next morn the Jewish mysteries I view,
My guide Manasses Ben Israel the Jew:
The lengthen'd prepuce now the dreadful steel
Cuts off, and now suspends in air, while all
The Israelites in noisy tumult bawl.
I gazing on, unthinking touch the chest,
Where holy Moses's sacred law is plac'd:

(151) Sequel of the Menagiana, pag. 15, Dutch Edit.

(152) Vigneul Marville, Mélang. Tom. ii, pag. 320, Dutch Edit.

(153) Petrus Daniel Huetius, Poëm. pag. 53, 54, Edit. Ulbraj. 1700.

Behold,

now informed that the author of a small Dutch book, printed within these few days [BB], makes use of it with great force and ability. But to speak of the supplement I design to give: it consists in an explanation of the objection I have grounded on the immutability of God [CC], and in the examination of this question, whether it be true, as I am told several

*Behold they start, and stare, and all around
Loud shouts and cries from every part resound.
All in a maze, dreading the bloody knife
And furious Jews, I ran away for life.*

That Jew is, I say, the Rabbin Manasses Ben Israël. The character Huetius gives of him in the preface of his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, does not agree with Benedict Spinoza, who never made a figure among the Jews; for he left them being very young, and after many contestations, which had made him odious.

Unicum selegi de multis argumentum, says Mr Huetius (154), ex Prophetiarum eventu conflatum, quod proposui hoc opere, & quo olim ad retundendam Judæi cujusdam, viri acuti sane & subtilis, contumaciam usus sum. Cum enim essem Amstelodami, & Judæorum, quorum magna est his in locis frequentia, ritus ac mysteria penitus introspicere vellem, ad eum deductus sum, qui tum inter illos peritissimus, ac totius Judaicæ disciplinæ consultissimus habebatur. - - - Among many arguments I singled out one, taken from the fulfilling of Prophecies, which I have proposed in this work, and had long ago employed to beat down the contumacy of a certain Jew, a man of wit and subtilty. For when I was at Amsterdam, and was desirous narrowly to observe the rites and ceremonies of the Jews, who are very numerous in those parts, I was carried to him who, at that time, was accounted among them to be the most knowing and skillful in all the Jewish discipline. You see he speaks of a remote time, and of the most famous Rabbin of Amsterdam: and it is to be observed, that this passage is to be found at the beginning of a large book in folio, which came out in the year 1678 (155), and whose composition and impression took up some years. I think that the time Huetius denotes by the word *olim*, is the year 1652, in which he travelled into Sweden; but if I was mistaken in this particular, it were still true that he means Manasses Ben Israël, who died in the year 1659, and not our Spinoza, who, as I said before, never kept a considerable rank in the synagogue.

[BB] The author of a small Dutch book, printed within these few days (156). He only calls himself N. N. Philalethes: the title of his book comes to this; *A demonstration of the weakness of Spinoza's argument, concerning the only one absolutely infinite substance*. He lays down as a fact; 1. That the whole system of Spinoza is grounded on this proposition: *That there is but one only substance, and that it is absolutely infinite*. 2. That from such a principle Spinoza drew this consequence, *That particular Beings are only modifications of that absolutely infinite substance*. The author maintains that this principle, being contested by every body, should have been proved with all imaginable care, and yet that Spinoza gave no proof of it. I could give some extracts of that piece, for I have seen a French translation of it in manuscript; but because it is but a small book, and in all probability it will be printed in French or Latin, before my Dictionary comes out, it were a needless thing to enlarge upon it.

[CC] An explanation of the objection which I have grounded upon GOD's immutability. You will find that objection above in the remark [N], numb. II. I must confirm it, since some persons maintain that the weakness of it sufficiently appears, if it be considered that no alteration happens to the god of Spinoza, as being a substance infinite, necessary, &c. Tho' the face of the whole world should change at every moment, tho' the earth should be reduced to dust, the sun darkened, and the sea become a luminous body, there will only be a change of modifications: the one only substance will always remain a substance infinite, extended, thinking, and so will all substantial or essential attributes. When they say this, they say nothing but what I have already confuted beforehand (157): but the better to shew their mistake, I must observe here that they dispute against me, as if I had maintained that, according to Spinoza, the Deity successively annihilates and

produces again. This is not what I object, when I say that he makes God subject to change, and divests him of his immutability. I do not confound, as they do, the notion of things, and the signification of words: by changing, I mean the same thing which all reasoning men have ever meant by that word: I do not mean the *annihilation* and total destruction of a thing, but it's passing through several states, the subject of the accidents it ceases to have, and of those it begins to acquire, remaining the same. The learned, and the illiterate, the Mythologists and the Philosophers, the Poets and the Naturalists, are agreed in this notion, and the signification of this word. The fabulous Metamorphoses, so much sung by Ovid, and the true generations explained by Philosophers, equally supposed the preservation of the substance, and kept it immutably as the successive subject of the old and new form. These notions have been only confounded by the unhappy disputes of Christian Divines: and yet it must be confessed that the most ignorant missionaries come into the right way again, when the question is no longer about the Eucharist. If you ask them, upon any other subject, what is meant by the change, conversion, transmutation, and transubstantiation of one thing into another; they will answer you, the meaning of it is, for instance, that wood becomes fire, that bread becomes blood, and blood flesh, and so on. They do not think then of the improper expressions consecrated to the controversy of the Eucharist, that the bread is converted and transubstantiated into the body of our Saviour. This way of speaking does by no means agree with the doctrine designed to be explained by it: it is as if one should say, that the air of a cask is transformed, changed, converted, and transubstantiated into the wine poured into the cask. The air goes somewhere else, and the wine succeeds it in the same place: one of them is not in the least metamorphosed into the other. Neither is the mystery of the Eucharist, as it is explained by the Roman Catholics, any metamorphosis: the bread is annihilated, as to it's substance; the body of CHRIST takes the place of the bread, and is not the subject of inherence of the accidents of that which are preserved without their substance. But I repeat it again, this is the only case wherein the missionaries make a wrong use of the words *change*, *conversion*, or *transmutation*, of one Being into another: in all other things, they suppose, with the rest of mankind, 1. That it is essential to a transformation, that the subject of the forms, that are destroyed, should subsist under the new forms. 2. That tho' the subject be preserved, as to what is essential in it, yet it undergoes an internal change, properly so called, and inconsistent with an immutable Being. Let the Spinosis therefore no longer imagine that they will be allowed to coin a new language, contrary to the ideas of all mankind. If they have any sincerity left, they must confess, that, according to their system, GOD is subject to all the vicissitudes, and all the revolutions, to which the *materia prima* of Aristotle is liable, in the system of the Peripatetics. But could any thing be more absurd than to maintain, that supposing Aristotle's doctrine, matter is a substance which never undergoes any change?

But in order to embarrass the Spinosis, it is but deferring them to give a definition of change. They must define it in such manner, that either it will not differ from the total destruction of a subject, or that it will agree with that one only substance, which they call GOD. If they define it in the first manner, they will make themselves more ridiculous still than the transubstantiators; and if they define it in the second manner, they will give up the cause.

I add, that the reason they alledge to elude my objections, proves too much; for if it was a good one, they must needs teach that there never was, nor will be, any change in the world, and that all manner of change is impossible, whether great or small. Let us prove this consequence. The reason, say they, why GOD is immutable, is, because, as a substance, and an extension,

(154) Petrus Daniel Huetius, in Prefat. Demonstrat. Evangelicæ, p. m. 3.

(155) The first edition of Huetius's *Demonstratio Evangelica* was published in 1678, though the year 1679, is in the title page.

(156) At Amsterdam for Bernard Vischer 1701.

(157) See numb. II, of the remark [N].

several persons pretend that I have not at all understood Spinoza's doctrine [DD]. It were a very strange thing, since I have only undertaken to confute the proposition, which

extension, he neither is nor can be subject to any change. He is an extended substance under the form of fire, as well as under the form of wood, which is converted into fire, and so with other things. I will prove to them by this very reason, that the modifications themselves are immutable. Man is according to their system, a modification of GOD; they own that man is subject to change, since he is sometimes merry, and sometimes melancholy; sometimes he wills one thing, and sometimes he wills it not. This is no change, will I say; for he is as much a man when merry as when melancholy: the essential attributes of man remain immutably in him, whether he be willing to sell his house, or to keep it. Let us suppose the most inconstant man in the world, and such as might fitly apply to himself these verses of Horace:

Mea pugnat sententia secum.
Quod petiit, spernit: repetit, quod nuper omisit.
Æstuat, & vitæ disconvenit ordine toto.
Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis (158).

(158) Horat.
Epist. I, lib. I,
ver. 97. See
also the passage
cited above cita-
tion (92).

*My mind is with itself at strife,
And disagrees in all the course of life;
And what it hated now, it now desires;
What now it throws away, it now admires;
Unsettled as the sea, or fleeting air,
It razes, builds, and changes round to square.*

CREECH.

Or who might, more than any body else, be the true original of these verses of Mr Boileau.

Mais l'homme sans arrêt, dans sa course insensée,
Voltige incessamment de pensée en pensée,
Son cœur toujours flottant entre mille embarras,
Ne sçait ni ce qu'il veut, ni ce qu'il ne veut pas
Ce qu'un jour il abhorre, en l'autre il le souhaite.

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Voilà l'Homme en effet. Il va du blanc au noir
Il condamne au matin ses sentimens du soir.
Importun à tout autre, à soi-même incommode,
Il change à tous momens d'esprit comme de mode;
Il tourne au moindre vent, il tombe au moindre choc.
Aujourd'hui dans un casque, & demain dans un
froc (159).

(159) Boileau,
Sat. VIII, ver.
35 & 49.

*But sillier man, in his inconstant course,
Is wilder'd, and oft strays from bad to worse:
Toss'd by a thousand gusts of wavering doubt,
His restless mind still rolls from thought to thought:
In each resolve unsteady and unfix'd,
And what he one day loaths, desires the next.*

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*This is our image just: such is that vain,
That foolish, fickle, motly creature man:
More changing than a weather cock, his head
Ne'er wakes with the same thoughts he went to bed.
Irk some to all beside, and ill at ease,
He neither others, nor himself can please:
Each minute round his whirling humours run,
Now he's a trooper, and a priest anon,
To day in buff, to morrow in a gown.*

OLDHAM.

Let us suppose a man, who has sincerely professed all religions in less than two years: let us suppose that he is gone through all the conditions of human life; that he has been successively a merchant, a soldier, and a monk, and then a married man; that he divorced his wife, and then turned register, financier, and clergy man, &c. If the Spinozists tell him, you have been very inconstant: Why? will he say, you

are mistaken, I have never changed, I have been as constantly a man ever since I was born, as a mountain has been a mountain. What could they reply to that argument *ad hominem*? Is it not most evident that the whole essence of the human species remains in the man, whether he wills the same things, whether he hates to day, what he loved yesterday, and daily changes his inclinations?

But to make use of an example very proper for a country, the inhabitants whereof are used to the sea; let us suppose that a Spinozist, at his return from Baravia, should say that his voyage has been longer than usually, because the winds changed almost every day. He might be answered, You are mistaken, the winds never change. Indeed it may be said, that they blow sometimes from the North, sometimes from the South, &c. but they always retain the essence of wind; and therefore they do not change as they are winds, and remain as immutable as your one only substance of the world: for you say it is immutable, because it never changes it's state as to it's essential properties. No more does the wind change it's state as it is wind, it always retains the whole nature and essence of it; and therefore it is as immutable as your Deity.

I go farther, and I say, that even when a man is burnt alive, no alteration happens to him. He was a modification of the divine nature when alive; and is he not so in the flames, or under the form of ashes? Could he lose the attributes that constitute a modification? Could he go through any change as he is a modification? If he changed in that respect, must it not be said that flame is not a mode of extension? Could Spinoza affirm it without contradicting himself, and destroying his own system? This is sufficient to shew that those are mistaken, who pretend I have not proved that this system makes GOD subject to change. My argument cannot be denied, without asserting that modifications themselves are immutable, and that no alterations happen in man's thoughts, nor in the disposition of matter; which is a most absurd thing, and contrary to the doctrines which the Spinozists are forced to acknowledge; for they dare not deny that the modifications of the infinite substance are subject to corruption and generation.

Let us desire of them to grant us, for a moment, by a *dato non concessio*, as the Logicians speak, that Socrates is a substance. They must then acknowledge, that each particular thought of Socrates is a modality of his substance. But is it not true, that Socrates passing from affirming to denying, changes his thought, and that it is a real internal change and properly so called? And yet Socrates remains still a substance, and an individuum of the human species, whether he affirms or denies, whether he wills or rejects a thing. And therefore, tho' he does not change as he is a man, he cannot be said to be immutable; and it may very well be said that he is mutable, and actually changes, because his modifications are not always the same. But let us grant to the Spinozists in our turn, by a *dato non concessio*, that Socrates is but a modification of the divine substance; let us grant, I say, that his relation to that substance is, as in the common opinion, the relation of Socrates's thoughts to the substance of Socrates. Since therefore the change of those thoughts is a good reason to maintain that Socrates is not an immutable Being, but rather an inconstant and mutable substance which very much varies, it ought to be concluded that the substance of GOD (160) does actually undergo a change and a variation, properly so called, whenever Socrates, one of it's modifications changes his state. It is therefore a most evident truth, that for a Being actually and really to pass from one state into another, it is sufficient that it changes, as to it's modifications: and if any thing further is required, to wit, that it should lose it's essential attributes, annihilation, or a total destruction, would be grossly confounded with change or alteration. See the Margin (161).

[DD] Whether it be true, as I am told, several persons pretend that I have not at all understood Spinoza's doctrine.] I have it from several hands; but no body could tell me the reasons of those who make such a judgment of my dispute. And therefore I can neither

(160) Note, that Aristotle, de Prædicam. cap. v, reckons among the properties of a substance, to remain the same in number under contrary qualities. Μάστις δὲ ἰδίον τῆς εἰσίας δὸντι ἐν τῷ ταύτῳ καὶ ἐν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν. Maxime vero substantie proprium hoc esse videtur, IDEM UNUMQUE NUMERO permanens contrariorum esse inceptivum.

(161) One may see in the *Journal des Savants* pag. 127, & seq. several remarks upon what would be sufficient to infer the generability and corruptibility of the Divine nature, if the Fathers had taught what is imputed to them.

which is the basis of his system, and which he has very clearly expressed. I have confined my self to the confutation of what he distinctly lays down as his first principle, viz. That God is the only substance that is in the universe, and that all other Beings are

precisely confute them, nor examine if I ought to yield to their reasons, for I know them not. All that I can do, is to justify myself in a general manner; and I think I may say, that if I have not understood the proposition I undertook to confute, it is not my fault. I would not be so positive, if I had writ a book against the whole system of Spinoza, examining it paragraph by paragraph. Doubtless I should not have always understood him; and it is not likely he himself understood every part of his doctrine, and could make all the consequences of his hypothesis intelligible. But since I have confined myself to (162) a single proposition, expressed in few words, which appear clear and precise, and are the foundation of the whole structure, I must have understood it, or it contains some ambiguities altogether unbecoming the founder of a system. However I need not be uneasy upon this account, both because the sense I put upon that proposition of Spinoza is the same his other adversaries have put upon it, and because the best answer his followers can make, is, that he has not been understood (163). Notwithstanding this charge, the last author who wrote against him (164), understands the proposition in question as I do; which shews that their accusation is looked upon as very ill grounded.

But to be more particular, what I suppose in my objections amounts to this. I say, that Spinoza taught, 1. That there is but one only substance in the universe. 2. That this substance is God. 3. That all particular Beings, material extension, the sun, the moon, plants, beasts, and men, their motions, ideas, imaginations, and desires, are modifications of God. Now I ask the Spinozists, whether their master taught those things or not? If he taught them, it cannot be said that I have been guilty of the *Ignoratio Elenchi*, or of mistaking the state of the question; for my objections, suppose that this is his very doctrine, and attack it upon that supposition. I am therefore safe, and whoever says that I have undertaken to confute what I did not apprehend, is mistaken. If it be said that Spinoza does not teach the three things above-mentioned, I ask why he expressed himself just as those would do, who should be extremely desirous to make the reader believe that they teach those three things? Is it a fair and laudable thing to use the common style, without annexing to the words the same ideas other men annexed to them, and without informing the reader of the new sense put upon them? But in order to discuss the matter, let us enquire wherein the mistake may lie. I cannot have been mistaken as to the word *substance*; for I have not confuted Spinoza upon that head; I have admitted what he supposes, that a thing cannot be a substance, unless it be independent of all causes, or have an eternal and necessary self-existence. I do not think I was mistaken in saying, that, according to Spinoza, God only has the nature of a substance; and therefore I believe that if there was any mistake in my objections, it would be only in putting a different sense upon the words *modalities*, *modifications*, *modes*, from that of Spinoza. But I repeat it again, If I was mistaken in it, it would be his fault: I understand those words as they have been always understood, or, at least, as they are understood by all the new Philosophers (165); and I had reason to believe he took them in that sense, because he gave no public notice that he used them in any other signification. It is the general doctrine of Philosophers, that the idea of Being contains two species under it, viz. substance and accident, and that a substance subsists by itself, *ens per se subsistens*, and that an accident subsists in another Being, *ens in alio*. They add, that subsisting by one's self, signifies only not depending upon a subject of inhesion; and because, according to their notions, this agrees with matter, angels, and human souls; they admit two sorts of substance, one of which is uncreated, and the other created; and they subdivide the created substance into two species. One of those two species is matter; the other our souls. As for accidents, they all believed before the wretched disputes, which have divided Christianity, that they do so essentially depend upon their subject of inhesion that they cannot subsist without it. This was their specific character, by this they were distinguished

V O L. V.

from substance. The doctrine of Transubstantiation destroyed that notion, and forced the Philosophers to say, that an accident may subsist without a subject. They could not avoid saying so, since they believed, on the one hand, that after the consecration, the substance of the bread in the Eucharist subsisted no longer, and they saw, on the other hand, that all the accidents of the bread subsisted as before. Wherefore they admitted a real distinction between a substance and its accidents, and a mutual separability between those two sorts of Beings, by virtue of which, each of them could subsist without the other. But some of them maintained still that there are some accidents, whose distinction from their subject is not real, and which cannot subsist without it. They called those accidents modes (166). Des Cartes, Gassendus, and, in general, all those who have forsaken the scholastic Philosophy, deny that an accident can be separated from its subject, so as to subsist after its separation, and they give to all accidents the nature of those that were called modes, and use the terms of *mode*, *modality*, or *modification*, rather than that of accident. Now since Spinoza was a great Cartesian, it is reasonable to think that he put the same sense upon those words as Des Cartes did. If it be so, he understands by the modification of a substance only a manner of Being, which has the same relation to the substance, as figure, motion, rest, and situation have to matter; and pain, affirmation, love, &c. to the soul of man. For this is what the Cartesians call modes. They acknowledge no other modes; from whence it appears that they have kept the old notion of Aristotle, according to which, an accident is of such a nature, that it makes no part of its subject, and cannot exist without it, and the subject can lose it without losing its existence. *Ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν τινὶ μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον, ἀδυνατὸν χωρὶς εἶναι τῷ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν.* Atque id in subiecto esse dico quod in aliquo quidem est: *Ἐ non uti pars: ut si autem seorsum ab eo in quo inest, fieri nequit* (167). All this agrees with roundness, motion, and rest, with respect to a stone, and likewise with pain, and affirmation with respect to the soul. If Spinoza annexed the same idea to what he calls modification of substance, my objections are certainly just; I have attacked him directly according to the true signification of his words, I have rightly understood his doctrine, and confuted it according to its true sense. In a word, there is no ground for the accusation I examine. But if he had the same notion of matter or extension, and of human souls, as Des Cartes had, and yet would not give the name of substance to extension, or to our souls, because he believed that a substance is a Being that depends upon no cause; I confess I have not rightly attacked him, but have ascribed to him an opinion which was none of his. This was what remains to be examined.

Having once laid down, that a substance is what exists by itself, as independently upon any efficient cause, as upon any material one, or any subject of inhesion, he ought not to have said that matter and human souls are substances: and because, according to the common doctrine, he divided Being only into two species, viz. into substance, and modification of substance; he should have said that matter and human souls are only modifications of substance. No orthodox man will deny that, according to this definition of substance, there is but one substance in the world, and that this substance is God. Then the only thing that will remain to be known, is, whether he subdivides the modification of substance into two species. If he uses such a subdivision, and if he means by one of those two species, what the Cartesians and other Christian Philosophers call created substance, and by the other species what they call accident or mode, there will only be a dispute about words between him and them, and it will be a very easy thing to make his whole system orthodox, and to put an end to his sect: for a man is a Spinozist only because he believes that Spinoza has utterly destroyed the system of the Christian Philosophers, and the existence of an immaterial God, who governs all things with a perfect liberty. From whence we may conclude, by the by, that the Spinozists and their adversaries do perfectly agree about the sense of the word *modification of substance*. Both the

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(162) See the remark [P].

(163) See the same remark.

(164) See the remark [BB].

(166) Such as union, action, duration, and ubiquity.

(167) Aristot. de Prædicam. cap. ii.

(165) I use this restriction because of the difference there is between the doctrine of the modern peripatetics, and that of the Cartesians, Gassendists, &c. about the nature of accidents. It is a notable difference; but all comes to the same with respect to the objections against Spinoza.

are only modifications of that substance. If we do not understand what he meant by it, it is doubtless, because he put a new sense upon his words, without giving notice of it to the reader. Which is an effectual way to become unintelligible by one's own fault. If there is any term that he took in a new sense, and unknown to Philosophers, it is in

one and the other believed that Spinoza meant by it, a Being of the same nature with what the Cartesians call modes, and that he never understood by that word a Being, which had the properties, or the nature of what we call created substance.

Those, who, by all means, would maintain, that I am mistaken, might suppose that Spinoza rejected only the name of substance given to Beings that depend upon another cause, as to their production, preservation, and operation, *in fieri, in esse, & in operari*, as they speak in the schools. They might say that tho' he retained all the reality of the thing, he avoided the word, because he believed that a Being so dependent upon its cause, could not be called *ens per se subsistens, subsisting by itself*, which is the definition of substance. I answer, as I have done above, that if it be so, there is only a dispute about words between him and other Philosophers, and that I shall willingly confess my mistake, if it appears that Spinoza was indeed a Cartesian; but only that he has been more nice than Des Cartes in the application of the word *substance*, and that all the impiety laid to his charge, lies only in a misunderstanding. He only meant (will they add) what is to be found in the books of Divines, *viz.* That the immensity of God fills up heaven and earth, and all imaginary spaces *in infinitum* (168), and consequently that his essence penetrates and locally surrounds all other Beings, so that it is in him we have life and motion (169), and that he has produced nothing out of himself; for since he fills up all spaces, he could not place any thing but in himself, there being nothing out of him. Besides, it is well known, that no Being can exist without him; and therefore it is true, that the properties of the Cartesian modes agree with what is called created substances. Those substances are in God, and cannot exist out of him and without him. It is therefore no wonder if Spinoza called them modifications; but on the other hand, he did not deny that there was a real distinction between them, and that each of them constituted a particular principle of actions or passions, in such a manner, that one of them does what the other does not; and that when one denies of one of them what is affirmed of the other, it is according to the rules of Logic, and no body can object to Spinoza, that it follows from his principles, that two contradictory propositions are true of one and the same subject at the same time.

All this signifies nothing; and in order to come directly to the point, a plain answer should be given to this precise question: does the true and proper character of modification agree to matter with respect to God; or does it not agree to it? Before you answer it, let me explain by some examples, what the proper character of modification is. It is to be in a subject in the same manner as motion is in matter, and thought in the soul of a man, and the form of a porrenger in the vessel called a porrenger. A thing cannot be a modification of the Divine substance, only because it subsists in the immensity of God, because it is penetrated by, and surrounded with it on all sides, because it exists by the power of God, and cannot exist without him, nor out of him; it is further requisite, that the Divine Substance should be its subject of inherence, just as, according to the common opinion, the human soul is the subject of inherence of sense and desire; pewter is the subject of inherence of the form of a porrenger, and matter is the subject of inherence of motion, rest, and figure. Answer now: and if you say that, according to Spinoza, the substance of God is not in such a manner the subject of inherence of that extension, of that motion, and of those human thoughts; I will confess that you make an orthodox Philosopher of him, that there was no ground to raise so many objections against him, and that he is only to blame for taking great pains to perplex a doctrine which every body knew, and to forge a new system built only upon the ambiguity of a word. If you say, that he believed that the substance of God is the subject of inherency of matter, and of all the varieties of extension and of thought, in the same sense as Des Cartes says that extension is the subject of

inherency of motion, and the soul of man the subject of inherency of sensations and passions, you grant all that I desire: It is in this sense I understood Spinoza, and all my objections are grounded upon it.

The result of what has been said, is a question of fact concerning the true sense of the word *modification* in the system of Spinoza. Must it be taken for the same thing, that is commonly called created substance, or must it be taken in the sense it has in the system of Des Cartes? I believe the last sense is the right; for in the other sense, Spinoza would have acknowledged some creatures distinct from the Divine Substance, and made either of nothing, or of a matter distinct from God. But it were an easy thing to prove by a great many passages of his books, that he admits neither of those two things. Extension, according to him, is an attribute of God; from whence it follows, that God is essentially, eternally, and necessarily, an extended substance, and that extension belongs to him as much as existence. The result of which is, that the particular varieties of extension, which make the sun, the earth, trees, the bodies of brutes, the bodies of men, &c. are in God, as the School-Philosophers suppose they are in the *materia prima*, or first matter. But if those Philosophers supposed that the first matter is a simple and one only substance, they would conclude that the sun and the earth are really the same substance. And therefore Spinoza must needs draw the same conclusion. If he does not say that the sun is composed of God's extension, he must acknowledge that the extension of the sun was made out of nothing; but he denies creation; and therefore he must say that the substance of God is the material cause of the sun, is what composes the sun, *subjectum ex quo*, and consequently that the sun is not distinct from God (170); but God himself, God entirely, since, according to his notion, God is not a Being composed of parts.

Let us suppose for a moment, that a mass of gold has the power to convert itself into plates, dishes, candlesticks, porrengers, &c. it will not be distinct from those plates, and dishes; and if it be further supposed, that this mass is simple and not made up of parts, it must certainly be entire in each plate, and in each candlestick; for if it was not entire in each of them, it would have divided itself into several pieces, and therefore it would be composed of parts, which is contrary to the supposition. These reciprocal and convertible propositions would then be true, *the candlestick is the mass of gold, the mass of gold is the candlestick. The candlestick is the whole mass of gold, the whole mass of gold is the candlestick.* This is an image of the God of Spinoza: He has the power to convert or to modify himself into an earth, a moon, a sea, a tree, &c. and he is absolutely one, and without any composition of parts; and therefore it may be affirmed that the earth is God, that the moon is God; that the earth is God entire, that the moon is so too; that God is the earth, that God is the moon; that God entire is the earth, that God entire is the moon.

There can be but three ways, according to which, the modifications of Spinoza are in God: but none of those ways is what the other Philosophers say of the created substance. It is in God, say they, as in its efficient and transitive cause; and consequently it is really and wholly distinct from God. But according to Spinoza, the creatures are in God, either as an effect in its material cause, or as an accident in its subject of inherence, or as the form of a candlestick in the pewter it is made of. The sun, the moon, the trees, as they are things that have three dimensions, are in God as in the material cause of which their extension is composed; and therefore there is an Identity between God and the sun, &c. The same trees, as they have a form, whereby they are distinguished from a stone, are in God, as the form of a candlestick is in pewter. To be a candlestick is only a manner of being of the pewter. The motion of bodies, and the thoughts of men, are in God, as the accidents of the Peripatetics are in the created substance; they are entities inherent in their subject, which are not composed of it, and which make no part of it. See the margin (171).

(170) *Matter*, as Aristotle says, *Physic. lib. i.*, cap. ix, remains in the effect it produces, λέγει γὰρ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐκείνου ὡς ἐξ ὧν γίνεται τὰ ἐκείνου. Hoc enim materiam quod rei cuiusque subjectum est primum ex quo inexistente sit aliquid.

(171) Observe this difference, that the accidents of the Peripatetics are really distinct from their subject of inherence, and that Spinoza cannot say so of the modifications of the Divine substance; for if they were distinct from it, without being composed of it, they would be made out of nothing. Spinoza would own it: he would not cavil about it, as the Peripatetics do, when they are told that accidents would be created, if they were distinct from the substance. See *Journ. de Trév.* June 1702, pag. 480, edition of Amsterdam.

(168) Note, that the Cartesian Divines explain God's immensity in another manner.

(169) Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὥμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμεν. In ipso enim vivimus, & movemur, & sumus. Act. Apostol. cō. xviij, ver. 28.

in all appearance the word *modification*. But whatever signification he takes it in, he cannot avoid being confounded, as may be seen in a remark of this article (a). Those who will carefully examine the objections I have proposed, will easily perceive that I have taken the word *modification* in the sense it ought to have, and that the consequences I have drawn, and the principles I have laid down to confute those consequences, do perfectly agree with the rules of reasoning. I do not know whether it be necessary to observe, that the side which I attack, and which always appeared to me very weak, is that which the Spinozists take the least care to defend [EE]. I shall conclude with this observation, that several persons have assured me that his doctrine, even considered without a relation to religion, appears very contemptible to the greatest Mathematicians of our days (b). This may be easily believed, if these two things be considered: first, that no man ought to be more fully persuaded of the multiplicity of substances, than those, who apply themselves to the consideration of extension; secondly, that most of those gentlemen admit a vacuum. But there is nothing more contrary to Spinoza's hypothesis, than to assert that all bodies do not touch one another; and there never were two systems more opposite than his and that of the Atomists. He agrees with Epicurus in rejecting Providence, but in all other things their systems are like fire and water.

I have just now been reading a letter (c) where it is said that *he lived for some time in the city of Ulm, that the magistrates made him depart from thence, because he there dispersed his pernicious doctrine*, and because it was there also that he began to write his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. I very much question all this. The author of the letter adds that his father, whilst he continued a Protestant, was Spinoza's great friend, and that it was chiefly by his means that excellent genius renounced the sect of the Jews.

I am not ignorant, that an apologist of Spinoza (172) maintains that this Philosopher does not ascribe a material extension to God, but only an intelligible extension, and such as falls not under our imagination. But if the extension of the bodies we see and imagine, is not the extension of God, whence comes it? How has it been made? If it has been produced out of nothing, Spinoza is an orthodox man, his new system signifies nothing. If it has been produced out of the intelligible extension of God, it is still a true creation; for the intelligible extension being but an idea, and not having really the three dimensions, cannot form the matter of the extension, which formally exists out of the understanding. Besides, if we distinguish two sorts of extension, one intelligible belonging to God, the other imaginable belonging to matter, we must also admit two subjects of those extensions distinct one from another; and then the unity of substance will be destroyed, and the whole structure of Spinoza falls to the ground. We may therefore say, that his apologist does not resolve the difficulty, and raises greater ones.

The Spinozists may take advantage of the doctrine of Transubstantiation; for if they consult the writings of the Spanish school-men, they will find many subtilties to answer something to the arguments of those, who say, that one and the same man cannot be a Mahometan in Turkey, and a Christian in France, sick at Rome, and well at Vienna; but perhaps they will at last find themselves obliged to compare their system with the mystery of the Trinity, to clear themselves from the contradictions that are objected to them. If they do not say that the modifications of the divine substance, Plato, Aristotle, that horse, that ape, this tree, this stone, are as many personalities, which tho' identified with the same substance, may be, each of them a particular and determined principle, and distinct from the other modifications; they will never be able to answer the objection grounded upon their overthrowing this principle, *Two contradictory terms cannot belong to the same subject at the same time*. Perhaps they will say some time or other, that as the three persons of the Trinity, without being distinct from the divine substance, as Divines teach, and without having any absolute attribute that is not the same in number in each of them, have nevertheless each of them some properties that may be denied of the others; so Spinoza may have admitted in the divine substance an infinite number of modalities or personalities, one of which does a thing, which the others do not. This will not be a true contradiction, since Divines acknowledge a virtual distinction, *in ordine ad suscipienda duo prædicata contradictoria*, with respect to the susceptibility of two terms that contradict one another. But, as the subtle Arriaga judiciously observes, speaking of

Metaphysical degrees (173), which some will have to be susceptible of two contradictory oppositions, that would be entirely to destroy Philosophy, to transfer to natural things what Revelation teaches us concerning the nature of God; for it would make way to prove that there is no real distinction between the creatures (174). *Dices quartò, dari distinctionem virtualem inter animalitatem, & rationalitatem, æquivalentem reali, quatenus, etiam si à parte rei sint idem, una tamen potest terminare cognitionem, altera verò non, quod est æquivalere duabus rebus distinctis; sicut, licet essentia divina sit idem realiter cum Paternitate, tamen essentia convenit communicari tribus personis, Paternitati verò non convenit ea communicatio. Respondeo . . . explicare res creatas per hoc addo difficile exemplum, est res faciles per difficillimas intelligere, præterquam quod, si ex divinis liceret argumentari ad creata, etiam posset inferri, animalitatem posse produci, quin producatur rationalitas. . . . (175) Imò etiam posset inferri res omnes creatas esse idem realiter inter se, & virtualiter, solum distinctas, & quando una illarum perit, altera producit, una movetur, altera quiescit, id fieri secundum diversas formalitates ejusdem entitatis. . . . Cum ergo Deus ex una parte propter suam infinitatem necessario careat compositione physica, & ex alia parte non possit natura divina esse multiplex, sed unica tantum in tribus personis, quæ omnia non possunt intelligi sine virtuali distinctione in ordine ad ea duo prædicata contradictoria, non licet ponere in creaturis similem distinctionem, cum neque creaturarum perfectio, neque ulla ratio efficax possit esse ad illam ponendam: imò potius (ut jam dixi) si semel poneretur, non esset ullum fundamentum ad distinguendas inter se realiter creaturas; & consequenter destrueretur tota Philosophia.* How much are we beholden to Spinoza! He deprives us as much as in him lies, of the most necessary of all principles; for if it was not certain that one and the same thing cannot be at the same time, such as it is, and not such as it is, all our meditations and reasonings would be insignificant. See what Averroës said (176).

[EE] *The side which I attack . . . is that which the Spinozists take the least care to defend.* I have attacked Spinoza's supposition, that extension is not a compounded Being, but one numerical substance; and I have pitched upon that part of his system, because I knew the Spinozists say the difficulties do not lie in that. They think they are much more perplexed, when they are asked how thought and extension can be united in one and the same substance. There is something odd in this; for if it be certain, according to our ideas, that thought and extension have no affinity one with another, it is still more evident that extension consists of parts really distinct one from another; and yet they are more sensible of the first difficulty than of the second, and call the latter a trifle if compared

(c) It is inserted in the *Mercurie Galant*, for the month of September 1702, and was written by an officer in the army of the Elector of Bavaria. That officer says, that he will speedily give in medals, the History of the Ottoman Empire, from its foundation, that it is a work wherein he has laboured two and twenty years, and that he will have it printed at Geneva. He also says that he designs to translate Quintus Curtius, into the Turkish language, which he has been desired to do by some persons at Adrianople.

(173) So they call the attributes *ens, substantia, corpus, vivens, animal, rationalis*, which constitute the nature of a man. It is agreed that they are not distinct one from another, but that they really are one and the same entity.

(174) Arriaga, *Disput. V Logica*, §. ii, num. 29, pag. m. 83.

(175) Id. *ibid.* pag. 84.

(176) Quo fit ut merito dicat Averroës hoc loco sine hoc pronuntiato non modo possibile non esse philosophari, sed ne disputare quidem aut ratiocinari. *Fonscæ in Metaphys. Aristotel.* lib. iv, cap. iii, pag. m. 655.

(a) The remark [DD].

(b) They have named to me among others, Messieurs Huygens, Leibniz, Newton, Bernoulli, & Fatio.

(172) Kuffelaar, *Specim. Artis ratiocinandi*, pag. 222. Note, that he is very angry with Blyenburg, who said that Spinoza ascribed a material extension to God. Note also, that pag. 230, & seq. He confutes one Adrian Verwer, who had said something against the system of Spinoza.

pared with the other. I thought therefore it was necessary to give them occasion to argue thus: if that side of our system can hardly be defended, which we

took to be proof against all attacks, how shall we defend the weak sides of it?

SPON (CHARLES) a Physician of Lyons. See the *Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres* (a).
(a) For July 1684, Art. V.

SPON (JACOB) a Physician of Lyons, and an Antiquarian, son of the foregoing. See the same *Nouvelles* (a).
(a) For February 1686, Art. IX.

SPONDANUS (JOHN DE) son of a counsellor and secretary of Joan of Albret Queen of Navarre, was born at Mauleon de Soule in the country of Biscay in the year 1557 (a). He made so speedy a progress in the *Belles Lettres*, that he undertook to comment on Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, when he was twenty years of age [A]. He enjoyed considerable posts, that of Lieutenant-General to the Presidial of Rochelle, and afterwards that of Master of the Requests to King Henry the IVth. He abjured the Reformed Religion in the year 1593, and immediately after published the declaration of his motives to that change [B]. A great many slanders were spread about against him [C]. He left the court a little after he had forsaken the Protestants, and hid himself among the mountains of Biscay. There he undertook to write a book of controversy, but,

(a) Petrus Frizonius in Vita Henrici Spondani, initio.

(1) Petrus Frizonius in Vita Henrici Spondani, initio.

(2) Id. ibid. pag. 3, cap. v.

(3) Florimond de Remond (or Remond, as he calls himself before his preface) Préface de la Réponse du Sr. de Sponde au Traicté des Marques de l'Eglise.

(4) Moreri knew not that he was brother to Henry Spondanus, Bishop of Pamiers.

(5) Bibliogr. Histor. Philologica-Curiosa, folio D.

(6) See the Epitome of Gesner's Biblioth. pag. 498.

[A] He made so speedy a progress: . . . that he undertook to comment on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, when he was twenty years of age.] This is what Frizonius observes; he adds, that Spondanus was the first who published such a commentary in Latin, 'Joannes Spondanus summo à naturâ instructus ingenio vir literatissimus, qui annos natus viginti *Iliadem* & *Odysseam* Homeri . . . Latine PRIMUS MORTALIUM commentatus (1). . . . 'John Spondanus, a man of great genius and learning, was the first who ever commented in Latin on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer, at twenty years of age'. If by this he meant, that when Spondanus was twenty years of age, he published that commentary, it would be a mistake, for the first edition was published at Basil in the year 1583, in folio. He dated the Epistle Dedicatory at Basil the twelfth of June in the same year. He had taken care of that edition himself (2), and was then twenty-six years old, but we may believe that he was only twenty when he began that work. He dedicated it to his Mecænas the King of Navarre, who was afterwards King of France. The second edition was also dedicated to that Prince by Sebastian Henric Petri, Bookseller at Basil in the year 1606. Florimond de Remond cannot be so easily excused as Frizonius, since he says that Spondanus published his Commentary on Homer when he was nineteen years of age. Here are his words, *In order to finish his work, he retired to the farthest extremity of this kingdom, to the mountains of Biscay, the place of his birth. There, amidst deserts and solitudes, moved by the incredible zeal which he had, to bring back to the way of salvation those whom he had left in the paths of perdition, he undertook to answer a book which Theod. Beza had just published (as his masterpiece) concerning the Marks of the Church. For that purpose he employed the most serious hours of three or four months, bestowing the rest, as it were for his amusement, in finishing his translation of Seneca, which will soon be published, and in revising his Hesiod and Homer, whom that rare genius had commented upon and published, when he was nineteen years of age (3). Mr Moreri justly says that Spondanus's Commentaries on Homer are not esteemed (4). The author whom he quotes speaks of them with contempt; *Notæ nullius momenti, quasque Casaubonus fuit vocavit* (5). Notes of no importance, and such as Casaubon called trifling. Notwithstanding we may admire how so young an author acquired the learning which appears in that commentary.*

Let us note, that in the year 1583 he published at Basil in 8vo. Aristotle's *Logic* in Greek and Latin with marginal notes. The Greek text was corrected in some places, and the Latin Version joined with it was new (6).

[B] Immediately after he published the declaration of his motives to that change.] He says in his Epistle Dedicatory to Henry the IV, that though he had imitated that prince in changing his religion, yet that example was not his motive: he acquaints us in his preface that he retired from the court, before his book was printed, that having put it in the hands of the Printer of Melun, he was obliged to go to his own country, on account of his father's death, and in or-

der to place his affairs on a better footing. During that time adds he, *I have heard the reports which went concerning me. Some were sorry for me; because I lost myself so unreasonably, and withdrew from my advancement near the King's person. Others laughed at me, as if my boasted conversion had only procured me a shameful retreat . . . They afflicted me most, who published that I was going again to change, and to resume my former errors, that the Sorbonne of Paris had caused my declaration to be burnt, because said they, it contained several Mahometan impieties; and all the mountains resounded with this report. For my part, I know that the most considerable Doctors of that faculty had seen it, and approved it under their hand. However, I was very desirous to find a copy of it, that I might more clearly prove this report to be false (7). At last he recovered one, he revised the work, and gave it to be printed. The Antwerp edition of it by Arnault Coninx 1595 in 8vo, is that which I have used. I have not seen that of the year 1597 (8). Florimond de Remond is not exact, when he affirms that Spondanus, after he had published the reasons of his happy conversion . . . took the resolution to leave the court (9).*

[C] A great many slanders were spread about against him.] You need only see the Epistle Dedicatory of the Confession of Sanci, and the notes added to it in the Amsterdam edition 1699: but as the book I am going to quote is much more scarce than that I have just mentioned, I shall give a long passage of it. 'His death, which was so happy and so peaceable, could not escape the malice of those, who, bearing his conversion impatiently, have dared to publish that he died in a miserable and desperate condition, and that his death, which followed his conversion, was the sentence of his condemnation, and a judgment of God upon him. This is entering very far into the secrets of the council of God . . . It is truly a judgment of God, not upon Spondanus, but upon us. For it is a great sign of the wrath of God, when he takes off those who are useful and necessary to us, and who may promote the good and profit of the publick. And perhaps it was a particular providence of heaven which called him from among us, before he was encompassed with the torrents of abuse, which gathered on all hands to pour upon him. For let a man be ever so well armed with confidence; calumny will often strike home, and even innocence trembles at the approach of that monster, which Apelles represented in so lively a manner to the shame of the calumniator Antipholus. While he lived a Catholic, he looked on all these slanders with contempt: now he is in heaven, he pities and compassionates those who are the authors of them. I remember that one day when some person had shewn him on purpose the defamatory letters which were written against him: truly, said he, smiling, the author of them says not enough, if you consider his custom, but indeed too much, if you consider my innocence. It is his temper to revile with animosity, and it is mine to bear it with patience. Let him attack me, like an Huguenot, with

(7) Jean de Sponde, preface to his Declaration, pag. m. 7, 8.

(8) The author of the Notes on the Confession of Sanci, speaks of it, pag. 18, in the edition of 1699.

(9) Florimond de Remond, Préface, ubi supra.